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Executive summary
‘European perceptions of climate change’ (EPCC) is a two-year project, with the central 
aim of designing and conducting the first ever theoretically grounded cross-national 
survey of public perceptions of climate change and energy transition in Europe. EPCC is 
a collaboration between academic teams in four participating nations (France, Germany, 
Norway and the UK, led by Nick Pidgeon at Cardiff University) and Climate Outreach, a 
UK-based think tank which specialises in climate change communication. 
The purpose of this discussion paper is to provide a detailed overview of the socio-
political context in each of the four participating nations. A key feature of the EPCC survey 
is that its design was directly informed by these national ‘profiles’, as well as by an ongoing 
process of stakeholder engagement with an international advisory panel. Following a 
general introduction outlining the pan-European context, the paper presents four separate 
national analyses, each organised into five sub-sections: 
 y The historical, cultural & policy context in each nation; 
 y Key actors shaping public perceptions of energy and climate change in each nation; 
 y Key climate and energy-related events that have taken place so far; 
 y The anticipated consequences of climate change in each nation; 
 y Media reporting on energy and climate change. 
Because the analyses are quite detailed, we also provide in the next four pages a very brief 
summary of the key issues relating to each of the four nations in this Executive Summary, 
and identify Key Concepts (arising from these analyses) which inform the survey design 
(also highlighted throughout the document in blue boxes). In this way, we seek to make the 
links between the different components of the project clear. These key aspects informed 
the design of the EPCC questionnaire, alongside detailed study of the literature of previous 
surveys, and our own stakeholder consultation process.
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France: summary of key issues
 y France has low emissions per capita relative to other 
European and developed nations. This is largely due 
to the fact that the electricity production is mainly 
nuclear. Legislation voted in in 2015 will reduce French 
reliance on nuclear energy from an average of 75% of 
the electricity mix to 50% by the year 2025. Moreover 
there is a target to reduce total energy consumption 
50% by 2050. 
 y France hosted the COP21 meeting in Nov-Dec. 2015 
and Conference president Laurent Fabius won high 
esteem for successfully leading the parties to a strong 
and historic agreement. After the record-breaking 
signature of the Paris Agreement by 175 parties on Earth Day in April 2016, successor 
president and Ecology Minister Ségolène Royal announced 12 decrees or decisions 
advancing specific mitigation actions in France. 
 y The dense network of territorial government units is recognised and encouraged in 
national governmental discourse as a major actor in climate change adaptation. 
 y NGOs and civil society organisations are increasingly represented in state consultative 
bodies discussing measures to mitigate climate change.
 y The French Academy of Sciences includes a very small fringe of scientists who deny 
climate change which at times can gain a disproportionate presence in the media. 
 y France is a culturally and historically Catholic country. Pope Francis’ June 2015 
environmental encyclical calling on all religions to take action on climate change was 
taken note of in France.
 y France is projected to experience more frequent and longer periods of heatwaves 
(potentially fatal to at-risk populations – the elderly, infants, the chronically/gravely ill 
etc.) and droughts.
The Scandola Nature Reserve 
is located on the west coast of 
the French island of Corsica, 
within the Corsica Regional 
Park. The park and reserve 
were added to the UNESCO 
World Heritage List in 1983.
Photo: orangebrompton
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Germany: summary of key issues
 y The history of public engagement with energy and 
climate change in Germany has been strongly shaped 
by major public protests against nuclear energy. These 
started in the 1980s and continued into the 2000s, 
resulting in a nuclear phase-out before 2022. 
 y The level of environmental awareness is traditionally 
high among German citizens. In 1983 the Green Party 
entered the German Parliament for the first time and 
was part of the governing coalition between 1998 and 
2005. In the 2014 survey on environmental awareness in 
Germany, respondents ranked environmental protection 
as fifth among a list of the most important social issues 
currently facing Germany. 
 y Climate scepticism is not considered a serious problem in Germany. A national survey 
in 2014 reported that only 7% of respondents could be considered ‘trend’ or ‘attribution’ 
sceptics, only 8% as ‘consensus’ sceptics and only 5% as ‘impact’ sceptics. 
 y Politically, climate and environmental issues are closely related to the intended 
transition of the energy system in Germany (‘Energiewende’). This transition aims at 
meeting national energy demands with 80% of renewable energy by 2050. However, 
brown and black coal are still important energy sources in Germany. The coal 
extraction industry not only serves as an important employer in Germany but also 
forms a part of regional identities.
 y Climate change is a prominent issue in German news coverage, occurring frequently 
as the main cover story in magazines and newspapers. In 1986, Der Spiegel – one of 
the main news magazines in Germany – published an edition introducing the climate 
catastrophe with a fictional cover picture showing the Cologne Cathedral being flooded.
 y According to current models, the impacts of climate change will mostly be moderate 
in Germany. The economy, especially agriculture in eastern Germany and those regions 
that depend on winter tourism will be affected by rising temperatures.
The Jasmund National Park 
is a nature reserve in the 
Jasmund peninsula, in the 
northeast of Rügen island in 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Germany. It was added to the 
UNESCO World Heritage List 
in 2011 as an extension to the 
Primeval Beech Forests of the 
Carpathians and the Ancient 
Beech Forests of Germany.
Photo: Pablo Necochea 
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Norway: summary of key issues
 y Oil and hydroelectric power play important roles in 
Norwegian society, as key providers of employment and 
energy. While the country’s GHG emissions are close to 
the European average at about 11 tonnes CO2e/capita 
per year, Norway’s emissions profile is unusual, with 
essentially zero emissions from power production but high 
emissions from oil and gas extraction in the North Sea. 
 y The economic importance of the fossil fuel and 
hydropower sectors blends with social identity and 
conceptions of nature to form powerful narratives 
around how Norway found and exploited its offshore oil 
and gas resources. 
 y National and international companies, the central government bureaucracy, business 
and labour associations and NGOs seek to further their own interests in debates over 
the future of fossil fuel exports versus renewable energy and climate protection in the 
future. ‘Cognitive dissonance’ emerges because the country seeks a climate-friendly 
image at home and abroad, while being unable to curb its domestic emissions and 
maintaining fossil fuel exports at relatively high levels. 
 y Unlike countries such as the US and Australia, climate change is not considered 
primarily as a left-right issue in Norway, and Norway does not have any significant 
climate sceptical news outlets. 
 y Norway’s most important mitigation policies are the EU emissions trading scheme, 
strong support for electric vehicles and overseas aid to reduce tropical deforestation. 
 y Heavier rainfall, more frequent landslides and heavier floods are likely to result from 
climate change as average annual temperatures are expected to increase by about    
4.5ºC (range: 3.3 - 6.4ºC) and annual precipitation by about 18% (range: 7 - 23%). 
Norway is set to experience less snow and glaciers will shrink or disappear.
The Geiranger Fjord is a fjord in 
the Sunnmøre region of Møre 
og Romsdal county, Norway. It 
was listed as a UNESCO World 
Heritage Site in 2005, jointly 
with the Nærøyfjorden.
Photo: Whuups 
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UK: summary of key issues
 y The industrial revolution, the discovery of North Sea oil 
and an ambivalent/unsettled relationship with nuclear 
power are key issues in the historical background of the 
UK in relation to energy. 
 y A broad cross-party consensus on climate change led 
to a world-leading Climate Change Act (2008), and the 
instalment of the Committee on Climate Change to track 
the progress towards an 80% emission reduction by 2050. 
 y Media analysis has identified scepticism in the media to 
be primarily an Anglophone phenomenon with sceptics 
views given more presence in the US and UK media than 
in other countries.
 y The UK ‘political sector’ has a history of framing nuclear power as a solution to climate 
change, while public perception research identifies a consistent preference for 
renewable energy among the UK public (Spence et al. 2010).
 y Current conservative government announced the phase-out of subsidies for onshore 
wind farms and solar systems, and continues to support the development of shale gas, 
North Sea oil and gas, and nuclear power. 
 y In 2015 the government received criticism from UN scientists and business analysts for 
‘sending mixed signals’ with regards to the support for low-carbon technologies and 
solutions in the UK. 
 y Climate change is expected to increase the risk of severe flooding and hotter summers 
in the UK, with potential opportunities (e.g. for the agricultural sector).
The Jurassic Coast covers 95 
miles of stunning coastline 
from East Devon to Dorset, 
in Southern England. It was 
added to the UNESCO World 
Heritage List in 2001.
Photo: GaryW2008 
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Key concepts to inform 
the survey design
The purpose of completing these socio-political analyses was to provide – in conjunction 
with the advice and guidance of the stakeholder panel – a robust and practically-grounded 
evidence base with which to inform the design of the survey. By situating the design of 
the EPCC survey in stakeholder views and an analysis of the socio-political context in 
each participating nation, the project aims to go beyond simply documenting differences 
between European publics on climate change, and say something about why these 
differences are apparent. Throughout the document, key concepts which have, in addition 
to theoretical considerations, informed the survey design are highlighted in blue boxes. In 
this section we summarise them for ease of reference. 
The EU’s central position in the global climate change policy debate may impact on 
European publics in a number of ways. On the one hand, the (relatively) high profile 
leadership provided by the EU at a global level may act as a cue for European citizens 
to take climate change more seriously. But it is also possible that the centrality of 
climate change to the EU could mean that the issue of climate change is conflated 
with the ‘European Project’ – and all the negative connotations that this has for some 
European citizens.
The political attention given to the global economic recession, the serious impacts 
it has had on European citizens’ lives, and the ongoing challenges that people face 
in terms of employment and income are highly likely to detract from the relative 
perceived importance of issues like climate change.
In response to the discussion around climate change migration sparked by the current 
refugee crisis in the EU, our research could assess the perceived link between climate 
change and migration and concern about ‘climate change victims’.
Climate & energy in context
The EPCC survey will be able to shed light on the relationship between political 
ideology and views about energy and climate change in the four participating nations, 
as well as differences in views emerging from a classical ‘environmentalist’ tradition of 
thought, and more ‘technologically optimistic’ perspectives.
Climate scepticism is a largely Anglophone phenomenon (in terms of media coverage 
and public perceptions), and is therefore likely to be higher in the UK than in other 
participating nations. The concentration of climate sceptical views in the media may 
also lead to a higher political polarisation than in the other countries.
Climate scepticism & environmentalism
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Although the EPCC study cannot monitor media discourse and volume in detail, our 
analysis of survey results will be attentive to this as a possible factor in any changes in 
perceptions (within each nation, and whether these track trends in media coverage) 
and between the four nations.
Perceptions of political inaction may increase the sense among some citizens that “the 
impact of climate change was exaggerated by climate scientists as well as the media” 
(Ryghaug et al., 2011, p. 790). This should be seen in connection with the fact that trust 
in the state is much stronger in Norway than in many other countries. 
A widespread feeling of national environmental identity (being associated with the 
green landscape) might be able to explain attitudes towards renewable energy – we 
will be able to explore whether the four countries define their national identity in the 
same way and how that affects their attitudes towards climate change policies.
Media & other cultural inf luences
There are likely to be differences in the national climate and energy ‘self-identity’ of 
EU members who are ‘producers’ of energy and those who are primarily ‘consumers’ 
of it. There is an important question about whether these sorts of dynamics impact 
on public perceptions of energy and climate change – and how comparisons with the 
energy and climate policies of other EU states may influence national perceptions.
The EPCC survey will be able to compare levels of support for fossil fuels between 
the four participating countries, both now and into the future. There may be regional 
differences within nations (e.g. in the UK, on perceptions of North Sea oil).
The decision to phase-out nuclear energy and the transition to an energy system 
mainly based on renewables is one of the most important aspects of German 
environmental policy, and the EPCC survey will be able to compare public views on 
the components of the Energiewende with attitudes towards renewables in the other 
participating nations.
There are likely to be important differences in perceptions of nuclear power, for 
example in the way that the technology is ‘framed’ (as a ‘low-carbon technology’), and 
in different national response to the Fukushima disaster.
National energy policies
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The EPCC survey will be able to compare levels of perceived need for ‘personal’ or 
‘domestic’ activity to limit the effects of climate change, and assess whether they differ 
across the four participating nations.
Do per capita emissions relate to the four nations’ public perspectives on climate 
change and energy use?
The EPCC survey will be able to compare emotional and affective reactions to climate 
change and energy system change in the four participating nations.
Trust in the state is much stronger in Norway than in many other European countries. 
The EPCC survey will be able to compare levels of trust in policy actors, and perceived 
policy action/inaction.
The EPCC survey will include items that help explore the factors underlying this 
tension, which may derive from a conflict between classical environmentalist and 
technologically optimistic strands of thought. 
While levels of climate change scepticism have been low over the last few years the 
presence of climate change sceptic views in the UK media landscape might lead the 
public to underestimate how many people consider climate change in their daily lives. 
Personal engagement
The EPCC survey can identify whether perceptions of the seriousness of climate 
impacts in four participating nations differ, and whether these differences have any 
relation to the actual projected impacts of climate change in each nation. Where are 
there potential ‘opportunities’ from climate change for individual nations and will this 
impact on public perceptions of climate risks? 
People in areas more likely to be affected by climate impacts (and/or people who 
indicate previous experience with climate change impacts) might perceive climate 
change to be less of a ‘distant’ issue, which might lead to higher concern about climate 
change and more willingness to engage in related behaviours (differences may emerge 
between or within participating nations).
The UK public might be more positive about the national impacts of climate change 
compared to people in (e.g.) France due to the potential opportunities for the UK.
Climate impacts
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In April 2016, 175 parties (174 countries plus the EU, which represents 28 countries) signed 
up to the Paris Climate Agreement. The Agreement itself had been agreed at the summit 
held in Paris at the end of 2015. Whilst the Paris summit did receive media attention 
across Europe, it’s important to note the quantity of the coverage wasn’t as high as that 
of the Copenhagen conference in 2009. The quality of the reporting, however, was much 
more positive, and negotiators were able to get across a good news message about the 
outcomes of the summit.1 This sense of optimism has been carried through to the signing of 
the Paris Climate Agreement.
For the EU, the climate negotiations in Paris were a diplomatic success, aligning global 
ambition on climate policy with the EU’s longstanding call to limit global warming to an 
average of 2 degrees celsius.2 As part of its commitment to the 2°C limit the EU has set a 
climate target of reducing emissions by at least 40% by 2030. However, up to now that 
target has only been a statement of intention. The EU has held off implementing legislation 
in the run up to the Paris summit because the steps needed to meet the targets are deeply 
contested by some member states. Subsequent to the signing of the Paris agreement the 
EU now has to push forward with agreeing the required policies needed to deliver these 
cuts. This potentially divisive process will be taking place against a backdrop of other 
threats to EU unity. In addition, the challenge of implementing this climate legislation is 
exacerbated by the introduction at the Paris summit of a possible 1.5°C target for warming, 
which may require the EU to either bring forward the date by which the cuts will be 
achieved or strengthen the target itself.3
In the context of this crucial moment for European climate policy, the EPCC project 
addressed a significant knowledge gap with regard to European public engagement with 
climate change. While there have been national polls of EU member states and occasional 
cross-European surveys of public opinion (most notably the ‘Eurobarometer’ series which 
has sometimes included items relating to climate change), there is very little evidence on 
how citizens in different European nations differ on engagement with climate change.
By grounding the design of the EPCC survey in stakeholder views and an analysis of 
the socio-political context in each participating nation, the project aims to go beyond 
simply documenting differences between European publics on climate change, and say 
something about why these differences are apparent. The focus of the current discussion
1  Pashley, A. (2016). Why did Paris climate summit get less press coverage than Copenhagen? Climate Home. Online: http://www.
climatechangenews.com/2016/03/07/why-did-paris-climate-summit-get-less-press-coverage-than-copenhagen/
2  Geden, O. and Droge, S. (2016). After the Paris Agreement - New Challenges for the EU’s Leadership in Climate Policy. German 
institute for International and Security Affairs. Online: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=196630.
3  ibid
Introduction: climate change 
and the European public
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N paper is on the ways in which key events, influential actors, media and the wider cultural/historical and policy context in the four participating nations may impact on public 
engagement with climate change.
The European Union (EU) itself, and notably the European Commission, is an important and 
unusual actor at a pan-European level in terms of setting the agenda on climate change. As 
a longstanding, well-established and relatively stable regional grouping, it has historically 
been a leading voice advocating for policies to mitigate and adapt to climate change 
(Rayner & Jordan, 2013; Tvinnereim, 2013). In rhetoric and in policy ambition, the EU has 
tended to position itself as a world leader on climate change. The EU has committed to 
spending at least 20% of its €960 billion budget for the 2014-2020 period on climate 
change-related policies. And even if the ambitions of EU directives have not always 
resulted in proven policy efficacy or influence on other key global actors (Jordan et al, 
2010), it has been argued that “the EU can be looked upon as a rather benign ‘critical case’: 
if [it] cannot develop effective climate policies, then the implications for the globe are grim” 
(Wettestad, 2000).
However, while there are clearly important influences which might be expected to operate 
at a pan-European level, every European nation has a different social, political, historical 
and cultural context which shapes public engagement with climate change. 
There are likely to be differences in the national climate and energy ‘self-identity’ of 
EU members who are ‘producers’ of energy and those who are primarily ‘consumers’ 
of it. There is an important question about whether these sorts of dynamics impact 
on public perceptions of energy and climate change – and how comparisons with the 
energy and climate policies of other EU states may influence national perceptions. 
The EU’s central position in the global climate change policy debate may also impact 
on European publics in a number of ways. On the one hand, the (relatively) high 
profile leadership provided by the EU at a global level may act as a cue for European 
citizens to take climate change more seriously. But it is also possible that the centrality 
of climate change to the EU could mean that the issue of climate change is conflated 
with the ‘European Project’ – and all the negative connotations that this has for some 
European citizens.
While it is not within the scope of this paper to document in detail the dozens of trends 
and political, economic or cultural developments that have shaped the EU and its member 
states, it is possible to point to some ‘meta-trends’ that have characterised and defined 
Europe (and by extension the wider world) over the past decade.
The financial crash of 2008 – triggered by lending practices in US banks, but with its roots 
in debt-driven property market bubbles in many Western nations – quickly enveloped 
most of Europe in an economic recession that has not yet passed. While some nations 
responded unilaterally to worsening economic conditions by spending large amounts of 
public money on propping up financial institutions, and injected new stocks of money 
into the economy through ‘quantitative easing’, the EU as a whole advocated a policy of 
‘austerity’ (substantial reductions in government expenditure on public services), which 
was mirrored in many of its member states. Nations such as Spain, Ireland and Greece 
have experienced huge increases in unemployment and a serious deterioration in the 
living standards and livelihoods of many millions of people.   
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process of political fragmentation in some nations, with new political parties emerging on 
both the left and the right of the political spectrum. The left-leaning parties (e.g. Podemos 
in Spain, Syriza in Greece) have rejected the logic of austerity and called for a return to 
higher public spending and employment. The right-leaning parties (e.g. UKIP in the UK, the 
Front National in France) have tended to focus on the role of immigration and argued for 
tighter controls to protect jobs and services for existing nationals.
These significant and profound changes to the relative stability enjoyed within most EU 
member states previously provide the backdrop against which public attitudes to climate 
change, energy, or any other subject must be considered. 
The political attention given to the global economic recession, the serious impacts it 
has had on European citizens’ lives, and the ongoing challenges that people face in 
terms of employment and income are highly likely to detract from the relative perceived 
importance of issues like climate change. 
Assuming people have a “finite pool of worry” (Weber, 2010), issues which do not 
manifest themselves in an immediate and tangible way are likely to be crowded out by 
more pressing concerns (Scruggs & Benegal, 2012; Shum, 2012). And there is evidence that 
the perceived importance of climate change and environmental issues can drop (even if 
temporarily) in response to major economic and societal events (e.g. the recession sparked 
in 2008, or immigration flows) both in individual European nations (UK – DECC, 2015) and 
across the continent as a whole (Eurobarometer, 2013).
This is the pan-European context against which national attitudes to climate change should 
be considered. The paper now discusses in detail the national socio-political contexts in 
the four participating nations in the EPCC project.
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Historical, cultural and policy context
≈ The nuclear technocracy
France has the largest share of nuclear electric production in both Europe and the world, 
and the second largest number of reactors after the United States. In parallel with military 
development in the aftermath of World War II, the exploitation of France’s uranium 
reserves in a French-designed electronuclear programme, served a definite goal of 
increasing national prestige and energy independence. The 1973-74 worldwide oil crisis 
was a springboard for massive expansion of this energy option. France’s national utility, 
Electricité de France, sometimes called ‘a state within the state’, grew and prospered; and 
historically its nuclear production capacity was generally over demand levels, even with 
export schemes. Nuclear power still dominates primary energy production in France and 
contributes massively to France’s 50% plus rate of energy independence4 (CGDD, 2015) 
as well as the cheapest electricity in Europe.5 However, following a national deliberative 
exercise, the July 2015 law on ‘Energy Transition for Green Growth’ will reduce the nuclear 
share from an average 75% to 50% by the year 2025. In Spring 2016, there was discussion 
in the media of the large financial risks attached to Electricité de France’s Hinkley Point 
nuclear new build project in the UK.
The top-down, centralised governance visible in the nuclear sector is very characteristic 
of France, as is the idealisation of the scientific elite. Various commentators point to 
these traits – exemplified in the nuclear ‘technocracy’ – as shaping public perceptions of 
climate change and possible ‘solutions’ to it.
Teräväinen et al. (2011) analysed nuclear discourse in regard to climate change. The major 
strategies used by nuclear power advocates in France are necessitation (the authors 
quote then-President Sarkozy as saying in 2010 “There is not a single serious person who 
could think that we can fulfil our objectives by using only renewable energy sources”) and 
naturalisation (as when nuclear power production is described as self-evidently carbon-
free or low-carbon, safe and affordable). The main strategy used by opponents to nuclear 
power in France has been scientification, “resorting to scientific evidence and expert 
knowledge to refute the argument that nuclear power would help to combat climate 
change”, and borrowing government statistics to support claims.
4 A measure of self-sufficiency. Defined by the national institute of statistics INSEE.fr as: the ratio between national production of 
primary energies (coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, hydro, renewable energy) and the consumption of primary energy, in a given year.
5 14.12 C€/kWh in 2013, according to Electricity of France. Online: https://www.lenergieenquestions.fr/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
électricité-comparateur-pays.pdf
France:
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The current French President, François Hollande, proposed France as host of the annual 
UN climate change summit in Nov-Dec. 2015. This 21st Conference of Parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) was presided by Laurent Fabius, at the 
time Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the announced aim of reaching a binding agreement 
to limit global warming to 2°C beyond pre-industrial levels. In the lead-up to the meeting, 
much Government communication revolved around the need for France to be exemplary 
in its environmental performance (the COP21 village severely limited CO2 emissions 
resource consumption) as well as to provide strong leadership to ensure the protection of 
the world’s future citizens. Laurent Fabius won high esteem from the assembled delegates, 
leading the 195 parties to forge and adopt an agreement called “fair, sustainable, dynamic, 
balanced and legally binding”, and “holding the increase in average temperature to well 
below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit this increase to 1.5°C, which would significantly 
reduce the risks and impacts of climate change”.6 In April 2016, 177 parties signed the 
agreement at the United Nations in New York.7
In 2015-16 many governmental actions included specific references to climate change. For 
example, the government-financed voluntary ‘civic service’ employment programme for 
young people (16-25 year olds) incorporated a new topic: ‘Energy transition, climate and 
biodiversity’. Climate change is presented as involving every sector of economic life (e.g. 
agriculture - for environmental awareness and better use of resources) and all citizens (e.g. 
each household will be equipped with a smart electric meter to save energy). 
Climate change in France was historically framed as one environmental and ecological 
issue among many in the discussion of sustainable development. The term ‘climatic 
warming’ (réchauffement climatique) was/is used. Scientists prefer this term putting the 
focus on temperature rise, whereas political actors like Laurent Fabius tend to use the term 
‘climate disruption’ (dérèglement climatique), placing the accent on the consequences of 
global warming (Jouzel, in CNTE, 2015). 
Ministerial structures to deal with climate change emerged at least as early as 1992. 
In 2005 an Environmental Charter was incorporated into France’s Constitution and 
focused attention on the precautionary principle (PP). Although the PP discussion tended 
to focus predominantly on present-day public health and safety issues (and scandals), 
consequences of climatic change were identified among ‘grave and irreversible’ effects to 
be avoided. The growing discussion on the reduction of greenhouse gases has probably 
been framed by European targets (cf. the 2008 Climate and Energy Package negotiations; 
contrary to most other European countries, France had a limited scope for further 
emissions reduction in the power generation sector given her already dominant share of 
CO2-free power generation, mainly from nuclear; requests by both Chirac and Sarkozy to 
consider nuclear power as a renewable energy source or at least a ‘carbon-poor’ source 
were rejected by the EC). 
6 http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/the-french-cop21-presidency-has-presented-a-final-draft-agreement/
7 http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/a-record-over-160-countries-expected-to-sign-the-paris-agreement-in-new-york-on-22-april-2016/
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(Eurobarometer 2011, 2014). While local or regional governments are said to complain 
about ‘immature technologies’, the major obstacles  to climate adaptation and mitigation 
in France’s various regions today were described by one observer to be “administrative 
straitjackets, budgetary arbitrage, inability to work as teams, and resistance to change” 
(CESE 2015).
≈ Energy production and consumption
France’s energy needs decreased sharply in the hot year of 2014. Primary energy 
consumption (adjusted for climate variations) pursued a downward trend seen to have 
started in 2005. Final energy consumption reached its lowest level since 1996. Much of the 
2014 decrease can be ascribed to the residential sector’s lessened need for winter heating. 
Conversely, there was a slight increase for transport, France’s foremost sector of energy 
consumption (CGDD, 2015).
Primary energy production in France for 2014 was composed of 87% electricity, 12% 
thermal (renewable fuelwood and recovered waste), 1% oil, and less than 1% each 
for natural gas and coal. Within generated electricity, in 2014 nuclear was the source 
of 94% whereas hydro, wind and solar power together provided a total of 6%. The 
use of renewable fuelwood and hydro were both somewhat lower than usual due to 
weather conditions (CGDD, 2015). The 2014 final consumed energy mix in France was by 
descending order: refined oil products (45%); electricity (22%); gas (20%); renewables 
and recovered waste fuels (10%); coal (3%). According to provisional calculations, CO2 
emissions related to combustion for energy dropped by 9.4% in 2014 in real terms. 
Emissions adjusted for climate variations are clearly falling: they have decreased by 2.4% 
per year on average since 2007; their 2014 level was 15.6% lower than that of 1990 (CGDD, 
2015).
France is already one of the European countries with lower emissions per unit GDP and 
one of the developed countries with lower emissions per capita (7.51 tonnes CO2e/capita 
in 2012, compared to 9.15 in the UK and 11.47 in the UK, and below the EU-28 average of 
8.98 tonnes/capita8). This is largely due to the fact that the electricity production is mainly 
nuclear.
One interesting question which the EPCC survey will be able to address is whether per 
capita emissions relate to the four nations’ public perspectives on climate change and 
energy use.
The 2013 update of France’s national climate change adaptation plan (‘PNACC 2011-2015’) 
reinforced measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, in particular through improved 
energy efficiency. Actual implementation was favourably assessed at midterm: 92% of 
the planned actions had started; 60% of the needed budget had been engaged (i.e. more 
than €100m) in spite of a difficult budgetary context; 60% of actions were progressing 
according to plan (CESE, 2014).
8 Eurostat table t2020_rd300
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The programmatic law on ‘Energy Transition for Green Growth’ was adopted on 22 July 
2015 after some 3 years of preparation under 4 different ecology ministers, and significant 
debate in France’s two houses of parliament. The law was identified as a flagship 
endeavour of the Hollande presidency. It is presented as a way for France to fight climatic 
impacts, improve adaptation, and provide an example globally. Climate change adaptation 
is presented as a growth opportunity (120,000 jobs are expected in the next 5 years to 
develop renewable energies). The law legalises the ambitious targets already announced in 
the National Climate Plan in 2013: 
 y 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels);
 y 30% reduction in fossil fuel consumption by 2030 (compared to 2012);
 y Diversification of electricity production sources to arrive at a 50% nuclear mix by 2025;
 y Renewable energies to rise to 32% of final consumption and 40% of production by 2030;
 y 50% reduction in final energy consumption by 2050 (compared to 2012).
Amongst the measures with a potentially significant impact on public experience are: state 
aids to foster building insulation; clean transport and a circular economy; and support for 
better air quality, including traffic restricted zones in cities.
The law was heralded as going far beyond the ‘lowest common denominator’ identified 
by the European Council in 2014, and perceived as a good signal in the lead-up to COP21. 
However, ecologists criticised the absence of a calendar for phase-in. Discussion on 
how to achieve the targeted energy mix was not started until more than six months 
after the formal adoption of the law. In parallel to the signature by 177 parties of the 
COP21 Paris Agreement in April 2016, Ecology Minister Ségolène Royal issued decrees of 
implementation or news of progress on a dozen fronts. These include a call for tender to 
develop small-scale, localised hydroelectric generators; decrees on energy performance 
requirements for new build and revision of energy standards for existing building stock to 
become the most demanding in Europe; etc. Prime Minister Manuel Valls also spoke out on 
the need to reform transport policy in harmony with the COP21 agreement.
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≈ Central government
COP21, hosted by France in Nov-Dec 2015, was successfully presided by Laurent Fabius, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (he has since left those posts to preside the Constitutional 
Council). The minister was very active in the lead-up to COP21, emphasizing the goal of 
facilitating a strong consensual agreement to limit global warming to 2°C, and engaging in 
many international discussions. 
Climate change and energy issues are dealt with in France principally by the Ministry of 
Ecology, Sustainable Development, and Energy (MEDDE). Minister Ségolène Royal has 
taken over the presidency of COP21. Within MEDDE, the General Directorate for Energy 
and Climate (DGEC) is tasked with inter-ministerial coordination of policy to fight against 
climate change, and also to ensure energy supply security at ‘best price conditions’ in an 
open market. The National Observatory on Climate Change Effects (ONERC) prepared the 
2006 National Climate Adaptation Strategy and the 2011 Adaptation Plan (PNACC) after 
a national consultation in 2010. The 2013 PNACC update introduced a methodology to 
define the level of acceptable risk from climate hazards. ONERC acts as the ‘focal point’ 
coordinating France’s interaction with the IPCC. 
Other ministries involved include the Interior, Infrastructure, Research, Agriculture, and 
Overseas Territorial Development, etc.
Numerous national agencies give climate change issues a central place in their work 
programme, such as ADEME (Energy efficiency agency) and BRGM (Geological survey), 
amongst others. All promoted COP21 as a significant rendezvous in which France had 
an important responsibility to broker a political solution to climate change. In the Prime 
Minister’s office, the Centre for Strategic Analysis (now France Stratégie) inquired into 
public perceptions of the threat posed by climate change and levels of climate scepticism 
(Baecher et al., 2012; CAS, 2012), viewed as a determinants of the negotiating positions 
taken by the Parties. 
≈ The advisory system
The importance attached by the French state to ecology and sustainable development 
issues is evidenced by the multiplication of highly specialised (and often overlapping) 
public advisory bodies and agencies from the mid-1990s onward. 
The Economic, Social and Environmental Council (CESE) calls itself the ‘Third Chamber’ of 
France in light of its pluralistic and representative character. It counsels Government and the 
two houses of parliament on the formulation of public policy. Climate change and energy 
transition are strong themes for the CESE. In the lead-up to COP21 the CNTE is preparing 
statements and reports, including one analyzing the effects of France’s past 20 years of 
climate policy, and another focused on negotiation in view of brokering a Paris climate 
agreement. A special emanation, called National Council on Energy Transition (and now 
Ecological Transition; CNTE) includes representation from parliament, regional government, 
trade unions (both labour and management), NGOs (environment, consumer rights, youth), 
chambers of commerce, etc. Starting in 2013, CNTE engaged debate and consultation 
events across France to inform and prepare the 2015 programmatic energy law. 
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change (including construction, transport, urbanisation, use of oceans, etc.). It inspects 
the efficiency of government strategies and services in these domains and examines 
Environmental Impact Assessments for infrastructure plans, programmes and projects.
The Parliamentary Office of Assessment of Scientific and Technological Choices (OPECST) 
advises the two chambers of the legislature. Studies and hearings are led by members 
of parliament with the support of a permanent secretariat and a committee of 15 leading 
scientists. 
The French Academy of Science is a key advisory body, and is “the only academy 
of sciences in the world in which the debate over human responsibility in climatic 
disturbance is not yet closed. It is very sad and very grave” (corresponding member and 
climatologist E. Guilyardi, in Foucart, 2015). Among its 263 members this historic chamber 
contains a small number of active climate sceptics, including geo-chemist Claude Allègre, 
a bombastic former minister and author of widely-diffused material on climate change 
denial, and geo-magneticist Vincent Courtillot, criticised for repeatedly presenting data 
already refuted by peer-reviewed publications. In May 2015, an Academy working group 
suspended discussion of a pre-COP21 statement, due to objections over the rule allowing 
a minority opinion to be annexed to the majority statement. “It would come down to 
publishing a statement that the world is round, accompanied by another stating the 
world is flat”, said a former Academy president (cf. Foucart, 2015). A new plenary climate 
discussion led to the November 2015 publication of a statement confirming the 2010 
Academy report viewing anthropogenic climate warming as ‘unambiguous’, recognizing 
progress in reduction of uncertainties, and calling for resolute R&D and industrial 
innovation to transform the energy system (Académie des Sciences, 2015).
≈ Research institutes 
Institut Pierre-Simon Laplace (IPSL) is France’s primary climate research organisation, 
recognised among the major world climate science institutions. It is directed by 
climatologist and IPCC member Hervé Le Treut, and previously by Jean Jouzel (vice-
president of the IPCC). IPSL is composed of 1400 members including professionals and 
students. The CNRS (National centre for scientific research) is the network of university-
based laboratories and research groups. In August 2015, 10% of public information articles 
searchable on CNRS’s plain-language website Le Journal contained the word ‘climate’ 
(43 out of 431 articles). Other pertinent national research institutes are Météo France 
(meteorology), IRD (development), and INRA (agronomy). ONERC, mentioned above, is the 
focal point coordinating all these institutes’ interaction with the IPCC.
≈ Multi-level governance
France has a dense top-down territorial administrative network including vast 
responsibilities in risk governance. This state administration is superimposed upon the 
elected government structures (regions, departments, and municipalities large and small). 
Most, if not all, administrative and government units include some work programme or 
discourse on climate change. Particularly in the run-up to COP21, they are making efforts 
to raise awareness and consult the public. The Ecology Minister frequently claims that 
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knowledge-sharing platform open to all types of public and private actors. 
≈ NGOs
Since the 1990s French decision-making has increasingly incorporated stakeholder 
representation in advisory bodies and consultations. In particular, two environmental laws 
since 2007 have been developed and negotiated through a process known as ‘Grenelle 
de l’Environnement’. Themes of debate included inter alia: climate change and energy, 
biodiversity and natural resources, environmental health, green development employment 
and competitiveness. Stand-out NGOs in France include Greenpeace, WWF, FoE, CARE, 
Réseau Action Climat (RAC, a public knowledge network), France Nature Environment, 
Fondation Nicolas Hulot (the popular ecologist and action-reporter is also a special COP21 
advisor to French President Holland), and other ecological, faith-based or justice-oriented 
development organisations. 
‘Coalition Climate 21’ is a diversified forum of 75 NGOs and unions (grouping a total of 135 
NGOs internationally). It provides a forum where policy differences amongst the different 
member organisations can be discussed so as to “contribute to forming a balance of 
power favourable to ambitious and fair climate action, and the transformation of all related 
public policy”.10  In April 2015, Prime Minister Manuel Valls recognised their action to inform 
and mobilise civil society for a political accord at COP21. The ‘grand national cause’ label 
attributed by the PM gave the coalition free airtime on national television and radio. 
In April 2016, the television producer and militant ecologist Nicolas Hulot, head of think 
tank ‘Foundation for Nature and Man’, emerged in a survey as the most popular political 
figure in France.11
≈ Other actors
Pope Francis’ June 2015 environmental encyclical, partly attributing climate change to 
human activity and fossil fuels and calling all religions to take action, was noticed in 
the French context. In July 2015, President Hollande received representatives of the 
Conference of Religious Leaders of France (CRCF) covering the spectrum of monotheist 
and other religions. They advocate climate justice and call for a binding agreement 
on climate policy, supporting the 2°C target for limiting global warming. “It is first and 
foremost our relationship with nature, and with God’s gift of creation, that is at stake”.12
9    http://wiklimat.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/index.php/Wiklimat:Accueil
10   http://coalitionclimat21.org/en
11 http://www.lesechos.fr/politique-societe/politique/021878186464-nicolas-hulot-double-alain-juppe-dans-les-sondages-1217478.php
12 https://www.oikoumene.org/en/press-centre/news/religious-leaders-meet-french-president-to-advocate-for-climate-justice
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In 2009, 78% of French voters stated that the candidates’ environmental platform 
influences their vote (IFOP, in Baecher et al., 2012). Comments below on political party 
positions are based on a search of their websites in August 2015 and again in April 2016. 
In a representative national survey, ADEME (2014) categorised persons as ‘convinced, 
sceptical or hesitant’ about the reality of anthropogenic climate change. Correlations with 
declared political affiliation or sympathy (with 6 major parties) were calculated. While 
significance was not assessed, sympathisers of the right-wing parties showed the highest 
proportion of scepticism in their survey replies. The percentage distributions for four major 
parties are reported below. (For comparison, respondents declaring no political affiliation 
were categorised as 42% ‘convinced’, 11% ‘sceptical’, and 46% ‘hesitant’).
 y Socialist party13
France is governed today by a socialist majority. The new Energy Transition for Green 
Growth law, showcased by the Socialist Party as a direct response to the ‘climate threat’ 
or ‘climate challenge’, is an example of its ‘doctrine of eco-socialism or social ecology’. 
Like the government, the Socialist Party highlights energy transition as a great growth 
opportunity and a source of hope and optimism. In the lead-up to COP21, the Party 
website also laid typical stress on national government’s willingness to involve the local 
level and youth. France was urged to show ‘exemplary’ climate behaviour and facilitate 
a universal and binding agreement that will ‘maintain global temperature under 2°C [sic]’. 
‘There is not an instant to lose, it’s urgent and it’s the responsibility of this generation to 
prepare a different world for the coming generation(s).’ France’s role in COP21 was given 
a historic, revolutionary dimension: ‘After establishing human rights, we will establish the 
rights of Humanity, that is, the right for Earth’s inhabitants to live in a world where the 
future is not compromised by the irresponsibility of the present’. In April 2016, the site 
focussed primarily on electoral topics but two of three educational video segments on the 
homepage presented ‘ecological taxes’ and ‘circular economy’.
ADEME (2014) found that Socialist party sympathisers could be categorised as 51% 
‘convinced’ of the reality of climate change, 9% ‘sceptical’, or 39% ‘hesitant’.
 y The Republicans14 
The website of the newly named right-wing party centred around former president Nicolas 
Sarkozy, and his criticism of the current Socialist government, was searched using the 
keywords ‘ecology’, ‘environment’, or ‘climate’. No results were returned. 
ADEME (2014) found sympathisers with the UMP (former name of the party) to be 39% 
‘convinced’ of climate change, 18% ‘sceptical’, and 43% ‘hesitant’.
13 http://www.parti-socialiste.fr
14 http://www.republicains.fr
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The far-right nationalist party expresses a populist view on several current climate change 
measures. The ‘chaotic and irresponsible’ project, under Sarkozy and then Hollande, of an 
eco tax on truck transport is described on the website as a ‘hard blow’ for French truckers 
already subjected to ‘intolerable’ disloyal competition from East Europeans. Two FN 
parliamentarians published a communiqué on the website stating that they voted against 
the Energy Transition for Green Growth law. They recognise climate change affects: ‘health 
and climate risks, scarcity of natural resources are growing realities’, but they denounce 
the ‘coercive and limiting Socialist ecology’ poised ready to destroy the nuclear sector, 
the pride of France. ‘Although ecological issues are global, a pragmatic national response, 
respectful of economic and budgetary balances, is needed for a viable and sustainable 
ecology.’ In April 2016, ‘ecology’ appeared at the bottom of a list of site keywords, and 
returned news items all of which used environmental themes strictly to question the safety 
of the French populace and the probity of political leaders outside the Front.
ADEME (2014) found National Front sympathisers to be 33% ‘convinced’ of climate change, 
18% ‘sceptical’, and 49% ‘hesitant’.
 y Europe Ecologie les Verts16
The Greens’ website heralds France’s 2015 Energy Transition law, augmenting the share of 
renewable in the energy mix, as the concrete outcome of the ‘long battle’ by ecologists, 
and welcomes the ‘historic breach’ opened in the ‘most nuclear country in the world’. 
A bold picture of progress is painted: “Energy transition is a true societal project turned 
towards solutions with a future, enabling job creation (…) and stronger purchasing 
power for households”. Still, the ecologists will ‘scrupulously watch over’ the actual 
implementation of the law’s measures through decrees of application and interactions 
with the upcoming finance law. They denounce large projects on the boards in France 
(a new airport, a deep geological repository for radioactive waste) as ‘incoherent and 
incompatible’ and completely inadequate for facing the ‘climate challenge’.
ADEME (2014) found Green sympathisers to be 64% ‘convinced’ of climate change, 2% 
‘sceptical’, and 34% ‘hesitant’.
15 http://www.frontnational.com
16 http://eelv.fr
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Date Key event
1945 France's nuclear age opens: General De Gaulle secures energy 
independence and international prestige for France: a civil nuclear power 
programme will ensure energy supply by using (at first) French-mined 
uranium and will produce plutonium for the military programme.L
1974 Plan Messmer: In response to the 1973-74 worldwide energy crisis, which 
quadrupled oil prices, Prime Minister Messmer launches an ‘all-nuclear’ 
energy programme to reinforce France's security of supply. On advice 
from the nuclear technocracy, 13 reactors are to be built in 2 years. In 
2015 France is the world's proportionally strongest producer of nuclear 
electricity and home to the second largest number of working reactors 
(58) after the United States.
1986 Chernobyl: The nuclear catastrophe introduced a wedge into the French 
public's traditional confidence in centralised risk management. Although 
the words "the Chernobyl cloud stopped at the French border" may never 
have actually been uttered, this remains an iconic statement revealing 
France as a paternalistic state in the grips of the nuclear power lobby.
1992 Inundation at Vaison-la-Romaine: A major episode of flash flooding 
occurred on September 21 and 22, 1992, in Vaison-la-Romaine, in south-
east France, leading to 47 deaths in 4 localities.
2003 
 
Heatwave: Twenty thousand people died in the French episode of 
heatwaves in 2003, during the hottest summer in Europe since 1500. 
Unusually high temperatures combined here with socioeconomic 
vulnerability and in particular, social attenuation of hazards – a multi-form 
inability of individuals and institutions to recognise that people were dying 
of the heat (Poumadère et al., 2015). Since then, an efficient prevention 
policy has been set up by the French government. 
1999 and 2011 The 1999 storms: Lothar and Martin were violent European windstorms 
which swept across western and central Europe over 36 hours in 
December 1999. The storms caused major damage in France (24 deaths), 
as well as in southern Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. 3.4 million 
customers in France were left without electricity, one of the greatest 
energy disruptions ever experienced by a modern developed country.
The 2011 storm: Xynthia was a violent windstorm which crossed Western 
Europe between 27 February and 1 March 2010. At least 51 people were 
killed in France, most deaths occurring when a storm surge went over 
an ancient sea wall off the Atlantic coast. The storm cut power to over a 
million homes in France. Amid turmoil, the French Government announced 
in April 2010 the plan to destroy 1,510 houses in the vulnerable areas, 
fully compensating homeowners based on pre-storm real estate values. 
Xynthia triggered a government policy document called ‘Rapid Inundation 
Plan: coastal floods, flash floods and dike failures’.
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together government agencies and many NGOs interested in environment 
and public policy. Negotiated solutions and agreements were reflected in 
a Framework Law definitively adopted in 2009. 
Among recommendations was to increase the number of high speed trains 
(TGV). In 2015, the costly programme was reduced. Typically for France, 
political debate led to recommendations somewhat agreeable to all, but 
the implementation can be hampered by technical feasibility and cost (as 
well as by opposition from specific groups in the general population).
2009 COP15, Copenhagen: Media attention to climate risks was seen to drop 
off markedly in France after the failure to reach a political agreement in 
Copenhagen (Baecher et al., 2012). 
2010, 2011, 2014 Inundations in the Var: A series of ‘catastrophic’ floods in south-east 
France destroyed property and took several lives. At blame were 
inadequate local zoning plans and uncontrolled residential development. 
2010 ‘L'imposture climatique’: A book of scepticism and denial published by 
outspoken former Minister of Education and Research, geochemist and 
Academy of Sciences member Claude Allègre. Although the publication's 
scientific errors, falsehoods and ad-hominem insults were denounced in a 
letter signed by 604 researchers, Allègre's position drew attention through 
his high profile, his bombastic personality, and the support he received 
from a few other public figures (most notably, popular philosopher Luc 
Ferry, another right-wing former Minister of Ed. & Research). 
2010 Pursuit of Hinkley Point nuclear new build project in the UK: Despite the 
resignation in protest by its Financial Director, Electricity of France plunged 
forward with its project to build a new nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point 
in the UK, with trumpeted support from the Prime Minister of each country.
2011 
 
Fukushima: The tsunami and nuclear catastrophe had a significant impact 
on public perceptions of all types of risks, making it difficult to analyse 
annual trends in climate change perception (ADEME, 2011).  
2011 Fracking forbidden: With a divided parliamentary vote in June, France 
became the first country to forbid hydraulic fracturing. 
2013 Ongoing smart meters: Installation in process, to be extended to 35 million 
households.
2012, 2014, 2015 Fessenheim NPP: ‘Fessenheim: To Close, or Not To Close?’ Presidential 
candidate Hollande promised in 2012 that France's oldest nuclear power 
plant would be phased out by 2016. However, it received €400 million 
of funding in 2014 for refurbishment after the post-Fukushima national 
safety review, and has been judged safe by the Nuclear Safety Authority. 
Parliamentarians say dismantling Fessenheim would be a bad financial 
decision; a strong local/regional lobby points to 1,900 jobs that would be 
lost. In March 2015, an incident closed Fessenheim temporarily, renewing 
popular fears about its safety. Socialist government announcements 
subsequently claimed that the plant will close in 2017 as part of the energy 
transition. Greenpeace said there is no reason to focus on the Fessenheim 
reactors, “the issue is to close them all, and fast”.  
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2 to 8 units will reach 40 years of age each year from 2020 to 2030. If 
retired from service, an annual withdrawal from the grid ranging from 
1800 to 7200 MWh of electricity would result. In June 2015, the board of 
Electricity of France validated the ‘Big Refitting’ investment program worth 
€55 million over the next ten years. The target is to render 56 of France's 
current 58 reactors worthy for continued service up to 50 or 60 years 
(subject to authorisation in each case by the Nuclear Safety Authority). 
2015 Carbon and Road transport eco taxes: abandon and reprise: These two 
taxes were promulgated as part of the Grenelle Law, but withdrawn 
because they were seen to be disadvantaging the more modest 
economic groups in society (e.g. suburban commuters; truckers and small 
businesses in agricultural zones). Outcry from these groups gave a populist 
foothold to the opposition. The 2015 cancellation of an international 
contract and deconstruction of 173 eco tax toll booths will cost France 
some €800 million.
1997, 2015 Air pollution: Air pollution is the number one environmental problem 
cited by French residents. The inequitably distributed public health effects 
of diesel pollution are recognised by the administration. An extensive air 
quality monitoring scheme is in place. Daily air quality ratings and level of 
‘ozone air pollution’ are reported through the media. Particularly severe 
alerts were given in the summer of 1997 & 2015. 
Adopted July 2015 Programmatic Law on Energy Transition for Green Growth: The 3 years 
of preparation for the law included consultations and events across 
France. It sets ambitious targets in keeping with the government's desire 
to show France as ‘exemplary’ in the lead-up to COP21. Transition to 
a higher percentage of renewable energies is touted by government 
as an opportunity to create 120,000 jobs in 5 years. Despite a start to 
implementation, the law is nonetheless criticised by ecologists and NGOs 
as lacking a firm plan and calendar. 
2015 Successful conclusion of COP21 under French presidency: “Why will 12 
December 2015 be remembered as a great day for the planet?”.   In an 
emotional final day of the COP21, 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Laurent Fabius proclaimed 
the Paris Agreement adopted by 195 parties as “fair, sustainable, dynamic, 
balanced and legally binding”, and “holding the increase in average 
temperature to well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit this increase 
to 1.5°C, which would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate 
change". The agreement was subsequently signed by 177 parties in April 
2016.
   
17 
17 http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/laurent-fabius-officially-elected-as-president-of-cop21
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The MEDDE funded a 5-volume report (2010-2015) entitled ‘France’s Climate in the 21st 
Century’, led by climatologist and IPCC vice-president Jean Jouzel, which details the actual 
and foreseeable impacts of climate change in France. The discussion below also draws on 
Alex et al. (2014).
How will France be impacted by climate change? Extreme weather events are anticipated 
to be more frequent and/or more severe. In particular more frequent and longer 
heatwaves (potentially fatal to at-risk populations – the elderly, infants, the chronically/
gravely ill etc.) and drought periods are expected in France (CESE, 2015). Frequent forest 
fires linked to drought are predicted across an exponentially greater zone in France by 
the middle of the 21st century (according to a 2010 inter-ministerial report based on 
IPCC scenarios). Major public health risks include salmonella infections, which will total 
20,000 annual cases in 2040 with up to 40,000 supplementary cases per year by 2070. 
Previously ‘tropical’ diseases will be common as their insect carriers colonise France’s 
warmer territory (Le Treut, 2013).
Coastal erosion of up to 10 meters has already significantly affected 24% of France’s 
Atlantic coast along 1,720km, caused particularly by numerous winter storms in 2013-14. 
The Mediterranean area is also impacted. Increasing coastal urbanisation is seen as putting 
France at risk of major humanitarian disaster resulting from the combination of climate-
driven erosion and storms, and in 2012 the MEDDE launched a coastal management 
strategy. Extreme flooding is highly likely (as it is throughout Europe, according to the 
IPCC). Paris civil defence assigns 100% probability to a 100-year flood event in which up to 
1.5 million Parisians would have to be evacuated.  The OECD (2013) estimates that up to 5 
million residents would be affected by serious economic and social consequences as well 
as service interruptions and property damage (overall worth €20-40 billion).
Nuclear power plant operation is vulnerable to elevated river temperatures, reduced flow, 
and/or freezing (all hamper their coolant function), and to increased air temperatures 
(threat of vital safety equipment overheating, and surge in aquatic organisms that can 
obstruct coolant circuits). Storms producing major inundation have already been observed 
to affect nuclear plants (in 1999, marsh dikes were overwhelmed leading to the emergency 
shutdown of the 3 Blayais reactors). Scenarios on sea level rise are calculated for nuclear 
power plants, and tornado scenarios are now also under development. 
Indirect risks with potential impact for France and its policies are: climate migration, and (on 
a global scale) competition for natural resources and for territories (see also Alex et al., 2014).
Media reporting in France
As of 2004, the anthropogenic nature of climate change was “no longer questioned in the 
French media” with 97% of articles recognizing the influence of human activities (Fodor 
cited in Baecher et al., 2012). While media discourse was dramatizing and guilt-inducing in 
2004, by 2008 coverage moved to the “description of a global and crucial phenomenon” 
requiring mitigation and adaptation (Baecher et al., 2012).
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in the mid-range in terms of volume of reporting. Significantly fewer sceptical voices 
were found in French print media compared to the US or UK. This result is independently 
confirmed by Baecher et al. (2012), who also point out that French reporters do not feel 
bound to cite all viewpoints on a given question (in contrast to US practices of so-called 
‘balanced reporting’). 
A study assessed the topics covered in a year’s worth of cover pages for 5 French weekly 
magazines across a range of political affiliations, whose sales average from 112,000 to 
448,000. Most prevalent were ‘cold’ topics, i.e. those not related immediately to current 
news stories although possibly triggered by an anniversary. Topics tended to cover health 
and lifestyle, culture and history. Purely political and international topics clearly do not sell: 
less than 5% of the covers in the 2014-15 period covered were devoted to international, 
geopolitical or European issues (Le Monde, 2015).
Figure 1: Cartoon by Aurel, 
accompanying the online edition 
of an article (Foucart, May 2015) in 
the major French quality daily, left-
aligned Le Monde. “A climate sceptic 
slipped into the Academy of Sciences 
– Can you single him out?” [The 
clown says “I have proof”].
The article examined Academy 
members’ unwillingness to append 
a minority denial to a consensus 
statement on anthropogenic climate 
change, which was voted by the 
Academy pre-COP21.
≈ Social media
Blogs are identified as a major vector for the dissemination of climate scepticism, and 
described as engaged in a ‘veritable information war’ with the publication of stolen or 
falsified documents, ad-hominem attacks, etc. Such blogs emerged in France as of 2005-
2006, with the oldest being www.climat-sceptique.com and the most important being 
www.skyfall.fr (Baecher et al., 2012).
An analysis of tweets in the period around the Durban Conference (Nov-Dec 2011) found 
that in France (like Brazil and the US), tweets centred often on scientific questions. In 
comparison, tweets originating in India and South Africa were centred on political aspects 
of climate change. More generally, when political themes appear in online forums in 
France, compared to the US they mainly concern the role of industrial lobbies and the 
sources of research funding (Baecher et al., 2012).
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A small number of scientific journalists from left-leaning papers are identified with the 
issue of climate change (one at least maintains a knowledge bank and blog on climate 
science and political issues). They are anti-denial and pro-mitigation. The online 
publication of articles by these journalists usually spawns numerous reader comments, 
among which challenges from sceptics often voicing denial that global temperatures are 
warming. Baecher et al. (2012) noted that after climate change coverage dropped post-
Copenhagen, the ratio between a) the number of Le Monde online readers’ comments, and 
b) the number of articles on the subsequent Durban summit which inspired comments, 
“attains a maximum as if the public were more interested in this subject than the media”.FR
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Historical, cultural and policy context
The history of public engagement with energy and climate change in Germany has 
been strongly shaped by many factors, but perhaps none more than the major public 
protests against nuclear energy in the 1970s. Compared to anti-nuclear movements 
in other countries, Germany’s opposition to nuclear energy is the strongest and most 
persistent (Radkau, 2011). Initially, leftist intellectuals supported nuclear energy, which 
they regarded as a future oriented and progressive technology challenging traditional 
industrial structures. In contrast, the big energy companies, namely RWE, adopted 
a critical attitude, since they feared competition for their lignite-fired power plants 
(Radkau, 2011). Furthermore, the notion of protecting the natural environment was viewed 
as contaminated by the ‘blood and soil ideology’18 of the Third Reich. This changed 
dramatically at the beginning of the 1970s, when the environmental movement acquired 
an international and progressive character due to a series of international conferences 
(Radkau, 2011). The German left started to embrace the environmental movement creating 
a multifaceted and broad movement with opposition against nuclear energy at its core 
(Uekötter, 2012). 
At the beginning of the 1980s, ‘Waldsterben’ (forest dieback) became the guiding theme 
of the public environmental debate (Radkau, 2011). Culturally charged by the heritage of 
the German ‘Romantik’, forests have always been the focus of ecological considerations 
and sustainability efforts in Germany. At least until the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, this 
led to a shift in the public environmental debate from resistance against nuclear energy 
to opposition against brown coal (Hohenemser & Renn, 1988; Radkau, 2011). Eventually, 
‘Waldsterben’ was the key topic, which helped the Green Party to enter the German 
parliament in 1983 for the first time (Radkau, 2011).
Of course, German energy policy has also been affected by these societal developments. 
Since 1949, four factors have determined German energy policy: cost effectiveness, 
security of supply, social acceptance and compatibility with environmental and climate 
policy. In the 1950s and 1960s, energy policy was characterised by a focus on cost 
effectiveness. Even today, prices for electricity as well as for gasoline are an important 
factor in the public debate. In the public view, critique has formed stating that the costs 
of the current transformation of the energy system are carried mainly by regular citizens, 
while large companies and important industries benefit from generous exemptions. 
Because of the oil crises (1973/74 and 1979/80) security of supply gained in importance. 
With growing public resistance against nuclear energy since the middle of the 1970s, social 
18 ‘Blood and soil’ was part of the Nazi ideology referring to a supposed metaphysical relationship between a people and a certain 
territory emphasising the virtues of rural living.
Germany:
A socio-political profile     
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different phases of German post-war energy policy:
 y Reconstruction after World War II (until 1957);
 y Intensified competition between coal and cheap petroleum oil and gas (1958-1972);
 y Pursuit of security of supply (1973-1980);
 y Environmental protection (1981-1989) triggered by the debate around ‘Waldsterben‘;
 y Climate protection (since 1990).
The beginning of the ‘Energiewende’, i.e. the transformation of the German energy 
system towards the use of sustainable energy sources, can be placed, broadly, in the 
early 1990s with a bill on the feed-in-tariffs passing the German parliament and the 
implementation of some measures for promoting renewable energy. Its pace picked up 
with the first Social-Democrats and Green Party coalition in 1998 and the first phase-out 
of nuclear energy in 2000 with the ‘Nuclear Consensus’. The goals of the Energiewende19 
are to phase-out nuclear energy by 2022, meeting national energy demand with 80% 
of renewable energy by 2050, and to cut CO2 emissions by 80% to 95% by 2050 (with 
1990 as year of reference) in line with the overall EU goal for mid-century GHG emissions. 
Without a doubt, climate protection still remains one of the main objectives – if not 
the most important – of German energy policy. The disruptive change initiated by the 
Energiewende seems to be much more comprehensive than all the changes before. Since 
the Energiewende is still under way, it is difficult to precisely characterise the outline of 
the present phase of German energy policy. However, looking at the public debate about 
the Energiewende and the political goals associated with it, transport does not yet play a 
prominent role, even though the transportation sector contributes up to 20% of Germany’s 
overall annual CO2 emissions (UBA, 2012), which even increased in 2015 by about 1.5% 
(UBA, 2016). With this, the German Energiewende is targeting foremost electricity supply 
and less other CO2 contributors such as heating and mobility. 
However, the decision to phase-out nuclear energy and transition to an energy 
system mainly based on renewables is one of the most important aspects of German 
environmental policy, and the EPCC survey will be able to compare public views on 
the components of the Energiewende with attitudes towards renewables in the other 
participating nations.
Climate scepticism is not a significant problem in Germany (Fröhlich, 2014). Among 
sceptical perceptions of climate change and its impacts, Engels et al. (2014) identify only 
7% to be trend sceptics, 5% to be impact sceptics, 7% to be attribution sceptics and 8% to 
be consensus sceptics.
19 However, the process of the transformation of the German energy system was not only triggered by the Fukushima disaster. In 
fact, with the ‘Act on the Sale of Electricity to the Grid’ in 1991 and its revision and expansion with the ‘Renewable Energy Sources Act’ 
in 2000, the transformation of the energy system began 20 years earlier. Also, the phase-out of nuclear energy was already enacted 
in 2002 with the Amendment to the German Atomic Energy Act by the Social Democrat and Green Party coalition, before it was 
suspended by a general lifetime expansion by the Conservative-Liberal coalition in 2010. This in turn was amended in 2011 under the 
impression of the Fukushima disaster.
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≈ Governmental institutions
There are two main political institutions at the national level in Germany that have 
responsibility for environmental issues, including climate change:
 y Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building, and Nuclear 
Safety (BMUB): 
The areas of climate mitigation and environmental protection, including protecting 
the public from environmental toxins and promoting a sustainable handling of 
resources, have been core aspects in the 25 year history of this ministry. Besides 
preparing legislation and transferring EU directives (in the field of its expertise) 
into national law, the BMUB is charged with research funding and shaping specific 
research and support programmes. For these, the ministry can make use of taxes 
and the revenues from emissions trading. For example, since 2008 the ministry has 
provided €400 million from the auction of emissions allowances for a programme 
called ‘Climate Initiative’, which supports public projects on climate mitigation on 
a national and international level. In December 2014, the ministry published the 
‘Climate Action Programme 2020’ in accordance with the government’s climate 
mitigation and sustainability guidelines.
 y Federal Environmental Agency (UBA), Germany’s main environmental protection 
agency, founded in 1974: 
The Federal Environmental Protection Agency provides policy advice to federal 
bodies, including the Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building, 
and Nuclear Safety, based on previous analysis of various environmentally relevant 
issues, such as environmental and energy research. The UBA also provides 
information and data on environmental issues to the general public, like issuing and 
publishing the biennial ‘Environmental Awareness Survey Germany’. The German 
Emissions Trading Authority (DEHSt) is part of the Federal Environmental Agency and 
in charge of the implementation of the market instruments of the Kyoto Protocol, 
involving allocation, controlling and auctioning of emission allowances, reporting and 
cooperation with other institutions.
Climate and environmental issues are closely related to the intended transition of the 
energy system in Germany (‘Energiewende’), which is one of the main concerns of the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy which thus plays an important role in 
German climate and energy policy. Its main task is to coordinate, monitor and report 
on the progress of the German energy transition. Additionally, the German parliament 
may appoint non-partisan commissions (so-called ‘Enquete Kommissionen’) to work on 
specific policy problems. 
≈ Research institutes and scientific advisory councils
There is a broad spectrum of scientific advisory councils and research institutes, whose 
work contributes to the climate change debate in Germany. These institutes are often 
associated with individual scientists who appear as spokespersons and advocates for the 
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Helmholtz Center Geesthacht or an interview with Prof. Dr. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, 
director at the Potsdam Institute for climate impact research (PIK) – both in Der Spiegel 
editions). Some of the most notable institutes are:
 y German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU): It provides research on global 
change and environmental problems and identifies new areas of interest to German 
politics concerning global change (including climate change). 
 y German Advisory Council on the Environment (SRU): Climate mitigation is one of its 
areas of expertise. It submits a report to the German federal government every four 
years that assesses the development of environmental policy in Germany.
 y Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy: Focuses on trans-
disciplinary research in transitions towards sustainable development. 
 y Potsdam Institute of Climate Impact Research (PIK): Addresses scientific questions 
in the fields of global change, climate impacts and sustainable development. PIK-
researchers also contribute to the IPCC of the UN (coordination of the working group 
on climate protection).
 y Max Planck Institute for Meteorology: concerned with earth systems analysis. 
 y A number of other research institutes, some run as non-profit organisations, often 
seeking governmental funding, others as part of a university’s infrastructure, also 
contribute on various levels to research on climate change, sustainability and energy 
transition. Including:
 ~ Öko-Insitut e.V. – Institute for Applied Ecology: non-profit association that provides 
research for federal agencies, ministries, industrial enterprises and the EU.
 ~ AGORA Energiewende: funded by the Mercator Foundation and the European 
Climate Foundation, the AGORA Energiewende project offers a platform for 
discussion about measures that are necessary for a successful energy transition
≈ NGOs
Besides the above mentioned institutes, there are several non-governmental organisations 
in Germany involved in the debate about climate change and energy sustainability. On the 
national level, important organisations are:
 y BUND e.V. (Friends of the Earth Germany) with 530,000 members in 2014;
 y NABU (Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union) with 540,000 members in 2014;
 y Greenpeace Germany20 with 580,000 members in 2012;
 y WWF Worldwide Fund for Nature with 458,000 members in 2014.
20 Greenpeace is also a provider of eco-power in Germany.
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 y Germanwatch;
 y Global Climate Forum, Berlin;
 y Energy Watch Group.
The above listed organisations focus on raising public awareness (campaigning, organizing 
public protests, etc.) about environmental issues, lobbying and applying pressure on 
policymakers to take environmental concerns into account. 
Concerning the climate change topic specifically, Greenpeace, BUND and Germanwatch 
influence the public debate about climate change significantly (campaigning, PR work, etc.) 
and can be judged to have the most significant impact on policy makers (lobbying). 
Even though they focus on national affairs, international cooperation and presence is an 
important part of their portfolio. 
≈ Foundations (private)
In addition to NGOs, commercial enterprises also support climate protection efforts. The 
‘Stiftung 2°’, with members like Eon, EnBW, Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Bahn and others, 
supports the climate mitigation goal to limit an increase in the global mean temperature 
to 2°C. They work on the implementation of political goals in the market economy and on 
the corporate level. Another interesting player is the Mercator foundation which funds the 
Edenhofer Institute on Climate and Public Goods and AGORA Energiewende. The growing 
number of such foundations could be interpreted as a sign of the private sector’s rising 
awareness of the climate change issue.
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Since the formation of the environmental movement in the 1970s, there have been some 
key events which have had considerable impact on attitudes towards energy and climate 
change in Germany, summarised and presented in the Table below.
Table: Key events impacting environmental and climate change attitude in Germany 1970-
2014 (partly based on Radkau, 2011).
Date Key event
1972 Publication of The Club of Rome’s ‘Limits of Growth’: high influence among 
German decision-makers and policy-makers while its impact on the 
general public was limited.
1973/74 & 
1979/80
Oil crisis: 70% increase of oil prices illustrated the external vulnerability of 
the German economy. German federal government introduced car-free 
Sundays and speed limits on highways. 
1980s Forest decline (‘Waldsterben’): observation of forest decline as 
phenomenon where trees lose health and die without an obvious cause; 
highly perceived among the German public.
29 March 1983 Entry of German Green Party in Bundestag: the first successful new 
foundation of a political party in Germany since the 1950s.
12 Dec. 1985 Green environmental minister in Hessen Landtag: Joschka Fischer 
inaugurated as first Green minister. His wearing sneakers during the official 
inauguration became part of the German collective memory.
26 April 1986 Chernobyl disaster: huge impact on public perception of nuclear power in 
Germany.
1  Nov. 1986 Fire in chemical plant in Basel: the public is shocked by a huge fire in a 
chemical plant in Basel contaminating the Rhine river.
16 Sep. 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer: 
international treaty designed to protect the ozone layer by phasing out 
the production of numerous substances that are responsible for ozone 
depletion.
1988 Appointment of the Commission for the Mitigation of the Earth’s 
Atmosphere (‘Enquete Kommission zum Schutz der Erdatmosphäre’): 
Commission within the German federal parliament, served from 1987 until 
1990; among others, its final report in 1990 suggested a reduction of CO2 
emissions and accompanying legal changes.
1988 Seal deaths in the North Sea: tremendous number of seal deaths shocks 
the German public.
1989/90 Fall of the Berlin Wall/German reunification: fundamentally changed 
the political landscape of Germany and Europe. Reports on heavy soil 
contamination in East Germany.
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a new scientific-political governance style (i.e. publishing reports with the 
agreement of leading climate scientists and the consensus of participating 
governments).
28 Sep. 1990 Foundation of ‘Green dot’ company: starting point for German waste 
recycling initiative with great impact on waste awareness among German 
consumers.
1 Jan. 1991 Act on the Sale of Electricity to the Grid: precursor to the Renewable 
Energy Sources Act in 2000.
1991 Foundation of ’Elektrizitätswerke Schönau (EWS)’: the Schönau energy 
initiative embodies the first citizens’ electric company and were labelled 
the ‘Schönau rebels’.
June 1992 Rio-Conference on Environment and Development: establishing the term 
and concept of Sustainable Development in the media.
9 May 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change: adoption of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), an 
international environmental treaty.
30 April 1995 Brent Spar deep sea disposal: media campaign and three week occupation 
by Greenpeace activists.
1 Dec. 1997 Kyoto Protocol: adoption of the Kyoto Protocol which extends the 1992 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that 
commits State Parties to reduce greenhouse gases.
1998-2005 Coalition of Social Democrats and Green Party led by Chancellor Schröder: 
first Green Party government participation on federal level in Germany.
29 March 2000 German Renewable Energy Sources Act: introduced by federal 
government subsidies with fixed feed-in tariff roll-out of renewable 
energies in Germany.
14 June 2000 Amendment to the German Atomic Energy Act (‘Nuclear consensus’): 
Agreement between Social Democrat and Green Party federal government 
and the four leading electric power companies for phase-out of nuclear 
energy.
Aug. 2002 Elbe flood in Germany: perceived as securing the re-election of Gerhard 
Schröder as chancellor through high media attention of his on-site 
presence with election victory over his contender Edmund Stoiber.
2005 EU emission trading scheme: Start of the Pilot Phase of the European 
Trading System for CO2-emissions.
2008 G8-Summit in Heiligendamm: Chancellor Merkel became renown as the 
‘Climate Chancellor’ for her emphasis on governing climate change.
28 Oct. 2010 Nuclear lifetime expansion: the Conservative-Liberal federal government 
led by Chancellor Merkel agreed to extend the lifetime of nuclear power 
plants by on average 12 years.
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which killed nearly 20,000 people and led to nuclear meltdown at the 
Fukushima nuclear power plant in three of the plant's six nuclear reactors.
30 June 2011 Phase out of nuclear energy: in response to Fukushima the Conservative-
Liberal federal government led by chancellor Angela Merkel re-installed 
the phase-out of nuclear energy with the last plant closing down in 2022.
17 Dec. 2013 Incorporation of energy policy in the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Energy after formation of a new governmental coalition (Conservatives 
and Social-Democrats, led by Chancellor Merkel).
In December 2015, 195 countries came to an agreement to further reduce global CO2 
emissions (the so-called ‘Paris Agreement’). The preceding negotiations were based on 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), 147 countries submitted their 
INDCs prior to the Paris meeting (UNFCCC, 2015). Germany subscribed to a joint INDC 
prepared and submitted by the European Union on behalf of its member states. Here, 
the member states commit to reduce at least 40% of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 
compared to 1990 (European Commission, 2015). As this agreement was achieved just 
shortly before this report, concrete impacts on German policies are yet to be determined. 
However, the approach taken by the Paris Agreement can be seen as threefold: First, a 
technological approach or ‘vision’, which puts forward technological innovations to deal 
with the impacts of climate change and to reduce CO2 emissions. Secondly, an economic 
approach, which supports regulating CO2 emissions via market instruments. And thirdly, 
an approach, which targets consumption behaviour and the surrounding economic logic in 
favour of a sustainable transformation (Renn, 2016).
Anticipated consequences of climate change in 
Germany
According to current climate models, Germany will be, mostly, moderately impacted by 
climate change. Zebisch et al. (2005) report that in the last 100 years (1900-2000), the 
average temperature has risen by 0.8°C-1.0°C, with a specifically warming period in the 
1990s in Southern Germany. This increase in temperature can be especially seen during 
the winter months, which led to a significant decline in snow cover (30% - 40% less snow 
cover in areas below 300m above sea level in the last 50 years). 
Scenarios for future development (until 2080) show how this warming trend continues 
with a rise of the average temperature between 1.8°C and 3.8°C, especially in the South-
West of Germany. While the annual precipitation does not show significant changes, most 
scenarios predict an increase of precipitation during the winter months, and a decrease 
during summer. These climate trends, together with socio-demographic developments 
will lead to significant vulnerabilities in various industrial and public sectors in Germany. 
Sommer and Schad (2015) base their scenarios for future development (until 2050) in 
Germany on socio-demographic trends such as an ageing population and a trend towards 
urbanisation, which will lead to urban heat islands. Warmer summers thus will have 
possibly health threatening consequences, especially for people above the age of 65 
with little social resilience due to an increase in one-person-households. This regionally 
diverse vulnerability to heatwaves is also pointed out in Zebisch et al. (2005) scenario 
interpretation for trends until 2080.
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for inland waterway navigation. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, winter tourism will suffer from a decrease in guaranteed snow, 
while summer tourism might profit from future warmer trends.
While these climate impacts are not trivial, the EPCC survey can identify whether 
perceptions of the seriousness of climate impacts in Germany differ from those in other 
participating nations. 
Media reporting in Germany
Media reporting on climate change is an important determinant of the level of awareness 
and knowledge among the general public in Germany. 
In a 2012 survey, about 60% of respondents stated that they gather their information about 
climate change from weekly TV programmes, 42% from radio broadcasts, and 40% from 
daily newspapers. Only 23% pointed to friends and family as a resource for information on 
climate change (Schäfer, 2012). 
Climate change is a prominent issue in German news coverage (Schmidt et al., 2013). 
According to studies on media coverage about climate change in Germany (mostly 
newspapers and magazines), reporting has increased since the issue of climate change first 
surfaced in the 1980s (Neverla and Schäfer, 2010). However, the issue of climate change 
is often overshadowed and sidelined by other contemporary events, such as the financial 
crisis or other issues. Following the media’s logic (Galtung and Ruge, 1965), the intensity 
of reporting varies over time depending on specific events and news selection criteria 
(Rhomberg, 2012):
 y The release of the IPCC reports sparks media coverage of the event, political 
struggles and agreements, and potential consequences (Schäfer et al., 2011);
 y Conferences of the UNFCCC and the conferences of the parties are often intensely 
covered by renowned German media (Schmidt et al., 2013);
 y Occurrence of extreme weather events triggers reports on climate change (Schäfer et 
al., 2011).
Neverla and Schäfer (2010) observe how media coverage follows national-cultural 
interests, thus supporting the emergence of national-domestic images and frames 
of climate change. Nevertheless, Schäfer et al. (2011) pointed out the emergence of a 
transnational, global public evolving around the issue of climate change, by comparing 
German media reporting with other European countries (e.g. France or the Netherlands).21
21 Study based on the analysis of newspaper articles (N = 6899).
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 y Introducing the ‘climate catastrophe’
In 1986, the German news magazine Der Spiegel published 
an edition with a cover showing the Cologne Cathedral 
being sinking in water, entitled ‘Die Klimakatastrophe’ 
(‘The climate catastrophe’). The front page cover has 
become iconic within the realm of media reporting on 
climate change. It was picked up from a press release 
in December 1985, published by the working group 
on energy of the Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft 
(German Physical Society), which warned of a ‘threatening 
climate catastrophe’. Despite the association’s efforts 
to discourage use of the term, it became part of media 
coverage on climate change and thus part of an often 
simplified presentation of climate change, its causes, 
consequences and solutions in German newspapers.
However, this statement and its alarming tone can be seen as one reason the 
German parliament called an inquiry commission to deal with issues related to the 
mitigation of the Earth’s atmosphere between 1987 and 1990 (‘Enquete Kommission 
zur Vorsorge zum Schutz der Erdatmosphäre’). Its final report already proposed to the 
German Federal Government the reduction of national CO2-emissions by 30% until 
2005 compared to 1987.
The magazine front cover serves as an example of how climate change took a 
different path in its quest for media attention than most other politically relevant 
issues. Rhomberg (2012) states that unlike most other issues, climate change was first 
introduced into the public (media) discourse by science, and – after its ‘success’ in 
media coverage – picked up by German politics. 
 y The Kyoto Protocol & COP15
The negotiation on the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the COP15 in 2009 in Copenhagen 
were intensely covered by the media. Rhomberg (2012) states that media coverage 
linked the Kyoto Protocol mainly to mitigation, i.e. emission-reduction policies. The 
author argues this is the reason why the public debate about climate change in 
Germany focuses on CO2 reduction and mitigation rather than adaptation (Peters and 
Heinrichs, 2005; Post, 2008). However, it is worth noting that the Kyoto Protocol 
itself focuses on mitigation strategies rather than adaptation measures.
Arlt and Wolling (2012) utilised the COP15 event to specifically analyse how it was 
covered by German news media. The period of their analysis spanned 3 weeks 
before the conference and 2 weeks after (16.11.2009 – 31.12.2009) and covered 
394 articles from various newspapers and weekly news magazines. According to 
this study, German media used the Copenhagen summit as an opportunity to put 
climate change back on the news agenda, resulting in a comprehensive coverage 
of the event. Reporting characteristics include the presentation of causes of 
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climate change (emissions from private households, transport and industry), and a 
discussion of nations and groups of nations as perpetrators of climate change (with 
industrialised countries as most responsible, threshold countries as second, and 
developing countries as last in the list). The consequences of climate change were 
discussed mostly in global terms, i.e. there was only a little mentioning of regional or 
national damage due to climate change. In addition, consequences were portrayed 
as being negative for the environment and the habitability of the planet. Potential 
positive consequences were rarely mentioned. Concerning adaptation or mitigation 
measures, the study agrees with findings from other studies (see above) that media 
coverage focuses mainly on mitigation in terms of emission-reduction. In contrast, 
measures to adapt to climate change are less likely to be discussed in news reports. 
Measures are also mostly abstract and involve international agreements rather than 
offering specific guidance to citizens for adopting a sustainable lifestyle. Thus, it 
seems reasonable that news coverage focuses more on governmental actors in this 
area of conflicts and less on actors from economy, science or civil society.
≈ Trends in German media coverage 
In the early years of media reports on climate change scientific uncertainty was 
represented as a conflict or disagreement among scientists involved over the existence 
of anthropogenic climate change and its impacts. However, as scientific consensus 
emerged, German news media mirrored the consensus about the anthropogenic causes 
of climate change. Arlt and Wolling (2012) report in their study only 2% of daily newspaper 
articles mentioning climate sceptics or their arguments and only 10% in weekly news 
magazines. However, climate scientists even today do not fully agree with media coverage 
in Germany, as Post (2008) shows. Climate scientists are sceptical about the media’s 
attention to dramatic news and its possible consequences for scientific work. They also 
criticise how the media overestimate the validity of climate models and the way complex 
scientific issues are simplified, thus presenting a scientific consensus on these complex 
issues that does not exist.
≈ Media reporting on the energy transition and energy policy 
There is not much published academic work on media analysis and German energy 
policy. In 2010, a research report was published detailing aspects of successful energy 
communication based on stakeholder interviews, a media analysis, and a representative 
survey (Mast, 2010). The media analysis provides an overview of media reporting on 
energy and water conservancy in trans-regional daily newspapers in Baden-Württemberg 
in the year 2009. It concluded that articles on security of supply and energy prices 
dominate the media coverage on gas as energy source, often in view of German 
dependence on Russian gas supply. Renewable energy sources are generally viewed 
as positive and their expansion is endorsed. The topic of nuclear energy is discussed, 
particularly the remaining questions of nuclear waste disposal and reactor safety. The 
debate about extending the lifetime of plants is ambivalent; however, media reports do 
not follow arguments made by the nuclear industry, portraying nuclear energy as climate 
friendly, reliable, and guarantor for job security and low electricity prices. The rather 
negative assessment of nuclear energy as well as the slightly negative assessment of 
the development of energy prices for German households and industry leads to a more 
negative image of the energy industry in media reporting. Concerning the development 
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consider a change to a renewable supply. Second, regulation efforts are supported and 
thus, responsibility is seen to lie within the realm of politics. Generally, regulation of the 
energy market and re-communalisation of the energy industry find approval in the media 
coverage.
In 2013, 25% of Germany’s primary energy consumption was covered by black and 
brown coal (BGR, 2014). While black coal does not play an overly important role (in 
terms of extraction), Germany remains number one in the world concerning brown coal 
extraction: in 2012 16.8% of the global brown coal extraction took place in Germany. 
Even though the heyday of coal extraction in Germany peaked around 1990 (with about 
440 Mt/a) and then dropped significantly (after German reunification) to 190 Mt/a (BGR 
2014), it is still one of the most important energy sources for Germany. With 22,000 
people employed in this industry it remains a significant part of the politics of energy 
and the economy.
However, due to its poor environmental record, it is a huge obstacle to the German 
federal government reaching its climate mitigation goals. In order to ensure these CO2 
emission reduction goals, the implementation of a so-called climate fee was proposed. 
The idea was to charge major energy companies profiting from brown coal extraction. 
However, protests from unions and energy companies alike prevented its realisation, 
arguing that such an additional financial burden would threaten a considerable number 
of jobs and the future of the coal industry in Germany in general. 
These recent developments are part of a larger debate about the future of the German 
energy market, which – as of now – is organised as an energy-only-market, and the 
uncertainties the ‘Energiewende’ might or might not pose to the security of energy 
supply. In July 2015, the federal ministry for energy and economic affairs issued 
its strategy for the ‘energy market 2.0’ (BMWI, 2015). Among others, this strategy 
includes the transformation of brown coal power plants into ‘capacity reserves’. 
Again, this decision faces protests and criticism especially from environmentalists and 
the renewable energy sector, claiming that this instrument would in fact subsidise 
ecologically harmful and outdated energy technology.
Besides political regulatory means, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) was proposed as 
a technical solution to Germany’s problem with coal induced CO2 emissions. Massive 
public protests however (fearing dangers from this technology such as earthquakes) 
brought the development and application of this technology to a halt.
Example for illustration: coal extraction in Germany
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Historical, cultural & policy context
Norway has been characterised by egalitarianism and by relatively modest standards of 
living up until recently. Culturally, it is relatively homogeneous, with a strong Protestant 
tradition, but recently immigration, often high-skilled, to the oil industry and auxiliary 
industries (and low or medium-skilled for the service industry) has led to increased 
diversity, particularly in some of the cities. 
Norway’s image as an environmentally friendly country, combined with the massive 
emissions caused by its fossil fuel exports, has led to a duality in the national discussion of 
climate change. 
Many Norwegians consider themselves very green or think that Norway is a green country. 
There are several aspects to this. One is the strong outdoor and nature orientation. Another 
aspect is that production practices are perceived to be ecologically friendly. Energy being 
produced from hydropower is one example; another is that there is hardly any mass 
industrial farming (with the notable exception of fish farms). Related to this is a high trust 
in Norwegian products (and a complementary distrust of foreign products). The general 
belief in the quality and safety of Norwegian products includes the belief that they are of 
high ecological standard. A potential problem with this attitude is that if all practices and 
products are so good already then there is no room for improvement and no need to 
change (Rosentrater et al., 2012).
The EPCC survey will be able to compare levels of perceived need for ‘personal’ or 
‘domestic’ activity to limit the effects of climate change, and assess whether they differ 
across the four participating nations.
People feel a strong attachment to nature, but nature is not seen as a limited and precious 
resource that may get depleted and should therefore be preserved. Nature is perceived 
to be plentiful and to be there to be used and exploited by humans. However, despite 
traditions of modesty there seems to be an explicit demonstration of affluence in some 
respects. Norway can afford to heat streets and light hiking and skiing trails at night, and 
to connect the remotest regions to infrastructure. When it comes to fighting the elements 
and the darkness then being frugal is not generally the first consideration. This extends to 
private homes that tend to be overly lighted and heated to be cosy and warm. 
Furthermore, electric cars are not just bought because they are subsidised but also because 
they function as a status symbol signalling that the buyer can afford to be green (Griskevicius 
et al., 2010). Tesla electric cars are popular and bought by car enthusiasts across the 
population, not simply to be environmentally friendly. The rapid growth in electric vehicles 
Norway:
A socio-political profile     
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has led to new tensions, with some arguing that the move from fossil-fuelled cars to zero-
emission cars is not radical enough and that car use must be curbed in favour of public 
transport, cycling and walking, regardless of the absence of tailpipe emissions. 
The EPCC survey will include items that help explore the factors underlying this 
tension, which may derive from a conflict between classical environmentalist and 
technologically optimistic strands of thought.
Ambiguous messages are frequently sent by politicians, while climate change is at times 
considered taboo or subject to socially organised denial (Norgaard, 2006). In the words 
of Norgaard (2006), “We don’t really want to know.” Data collected from focus groups 
furthermore indicate that some Norwegians see climate change as less serious than 
scientific reports indicate because they do not see urgent political action. This suggests a 
‘governance trap’ whereby politicians and the public point to each other as responsible for 
solving the challenges related to climate change (Ryghaug et al., 2011). 
Perceptions of political inaction may increase the sense among some citizens that “the 
impact of climate change was exaggerated by climate scientists as well as the media” 
(Ryghaug et al., 2011, p. 790). This should be seen in connection with the fact that trust 
in the state is much stronger in Norway than in many other countries. 
From a motivational perspective, two factors seem to be important to distinguish what 
can drive the evaluation of climate change and its impacts as well as behavioural or 
policy preferences: instrumental considerations; such as economic interests; and value or 
identity-based processes. 
From an instrumental perspective, it follows naturally that Norwegians would, for example, 
be positive towards oil production (given its dominant role in economic prosperity; see 
below) and buy electric cars (thanks to generous government support). But issues such 
as oil and electric cars are also very closely related to values and identity. Oil is a central 
component of identity both on an individual basis (e.g., if one works for the oil industry and 
identifies with the job, or has a family tradition of oil related employment) but of course 
also on a cultural level (e.g., the Norwegian narrative of the oil discovery, the oljeeventyr, 
literally ‘oil adventure’ or ‘oil fairy tale’). There is great potential for emotional dissonance 
if something that has been connoted so entirely positively (like the oil tradition) turns ‘bad’ 
through the emergence of climate change.
Data from the Norwegian Citizen Panel show that oil and gas employment is systematically 
related to support for mitigation policies, where employees in the oil and gas industry differ 
from employees in other areas specifically with respect to those policy options that may 
threaten jobs (Tvinnereim and Ivarsflaten, 2016; see also Tvinnereim and Austgulen, 2014).
A very conspicuous divergence of the Norwegian pattern from what has been found in 
other countries is emotional reactions to climate change. Usually, something like worry 
or fear is among the most intense reported climate change related emotions. In Norway, 
in contrast, the most intense emotion is hope – a positive emotion (Citizen Panel data, 
see Figure 2 on next page). The emotion ratings are generally not very high, though; also 
hope is only in the middle range. These results may reflect social norms concerning the 
expression of emotions – that is, what people think they are expected to feel.
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The EPCC survey will be able to compare emotional and affective reactions to climate 
change and energy system change in the four participating nations.
Concerning risk perception, Norway shows the same difference between personal risk 
and general risk as in other countries (Rosentrater et al., 2013; Bostrom et al., 2012). That 
is, climate change is seen as a risk to the world more than it is to Norway. This is to some 
extent a valid perception in that the impacts will be much less negative (some possibly 
even positive) for Norway than for other parts of the world, and apparently people are 
aware of this. Still, there have been some dramatic landslides and flooding in Norway. 
In the future, climate change is expected to affect biodiversity (notably in the ocean and 
in arctic and mountain regions), critical infrastructure and buildings; but economic life is 
not seen as particularly vulnerable (Government of Norway, 2010). Since risk perception 
is affected by personal experience (Spence et al., 2011), there may be strong regional 
differences depending on whether a region was hit by some extreme weather event.
The EPCC survey will be able to assess and compare perceptions of national risk from 
climate impacts, and relate them to actual projections of climate impacts.
Key actors in the Norwegian context
≈ Government
The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (OED) is responsible for regulating and developing 
Norway’s energy resources, including oil, gas, hydropower and emerging renewable 
energy forms. The Ministry of Climate and Environment (KLD) is responsible for the 
administration of Norway’s main climate policy instruments, notably the national 
implementation of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, which has been 
operational in Norway since 2008. The ministry also reports emissions and actions to the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
Figure 2: Emotional reactions to 
climate change, Norwegian Citizen 
Panel data (Wave 2, March 2014)
Question wording: "With regards 
to climate change and everything 
you relate to it, how strongly do you 
experience the following emotions?"
1 2 3 4 5
Degree of emotion
Anger
Guilt
Anxiety
Sadness
Compassion
Hope
Interest
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In addition, the Norwegian government owns a 67% stake in Statoil, the largest oil and 
gas operator active in the Norwegian sector.22 This stake is managed by the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy. The high level of state ownership in energy sector thus arguably 
blurs the distinction between regulation and operation. It also underlines the contrast 
between the institutional interests of the Energy and Environment ministries. While 
such interdepartmental tensions are not unusual around the world, the fragmentation of 
environmental administration is perhaps particularly clear in Norway given that the largest 
company in the country’s main emitting sector – oil and gas – is also majority state owned.
≈ Local government
Norway’s state structure is fiscally centralised, but gives municipalities wide powers in 
area planning. This gives them an important role in adaptation activities. Notably in light 
of extreme weather events over the past few years (floods, winter droughts and storms), 
municipalities have taken initiatives to improve the resilience of local communities. 
This work is supported by national ministries, research funding and notably by county 
governors (equivalent to French préfets) who oversee area planning in the 19 counties. 
≈ Political parties
Unlike countries such as the US and Australia, climate change is not considered primarily 
as a left-right issue in Norway. The political debate is marked by a wide consensus on 
the reality of the problem and the need to enact significant measures, as evidenced by 
two legislative ‘climate compounds’ (klimaforlik) comprising large, cross-party majorities 
in the country’s parliament. This consensus on the broader aspects has to some extent 
stifled climate change as an issue for election campaigning (Gloppen et al., 2014). A recent 
example of this consensus is seen in the unanimous parliamentary support for divestment 
from coal by the €800bn Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund (a.k.a. ‘oil fund’) on 28 May, 
2015.23 
Furthermore, political debate on climate change, which takes place largely over issues 
related to mitigation, crosses the left-right axis of national politics (Båtstrand, 2012). 
Instead, the main contrast is seen between large parties (Labour, Conservatives and the 
populist right Progress Party), who are generally given low marks by environmental NGOs, 
and smaller parties (notably the Greens, Socialist Left, Liberals and sometimes Christian 
Democrats) who are seen as more environmentally friendly. 
At the same time, results from the Norwegian Citizen Panel indicate that self-identified 
left-right placement has a significant effect on public opinion on climate change (Helliesen, 
2015). This suggests a disjuncture between consensus on the part of political actors and 
public disagreement on climate change across the ideological spectrum. It is also worth 
noting that Norway has an unusually high number of parties that may reasonably be 
termed ‘green’: The Liberal Party (centrist, leaning right); the Socialist Left (left of Labour) 
and the most recent addition, in Parliament since 2013, the Green Party (self-identified as 
independent but whose voters tend to lean to the left). 
22 Statoil is internationally active and has been involved in Canadian oil sands, which has led to controversy in Norway given the 
relatively high carbon intensity of this type of fuel and environmental effects around extraction areas.
23 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/27/norway-sovereign-fund-reduce-coal-assets
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The EPCC survey will be able to shed light on the relationship between political 
ideology and views about energy and climate change in the four participating nations.
≈ Business
The Norwegian power sector is dominated by hydroelectric generators fed from mountain 
reservoirs. In 2012, Norway’s hydropower production constituted 96.7% of total electricity 
production (143 TWh out of 148 TWh); this would amount to 110% of total domestic 
consumption due to a net export of 18 TWh.24 To further promote renewable electricity, 
Norway and Sweden have instituted a common market for green certificates, requiring 
a certain percentage of production to come from new renewable energy. In Norway, the 
energy projects supported by green certificates are dominated by small hydro projects, 
often run-of-river projects.25 Norwegian renewable electricity producers are able to sell 
certificates of origin, as specified in the EU renewable electricity (RES) directive,26 but 
domestic demand for such certificates is low and most are exported.27
The most significant businesses in Norway in the field of climate change are the oil 
companies, including Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Eni, Lundin, Det Norske Oljeselskap, Statoil, 
Shell and Total. Statoil, which is majority-owned by the Norwegian state, aligns itself with 
conventional climate science in public statements, unlike some other major oil companies. 
It actively promotes gas as a climate solution. In 2015, a separate business area for 
emerging energy technologies - notably offshore wind - was established. Statoil remains 
committed to exploring and exploiting resources in the Arctic, despite calls for this activity 
to be curbed due to global carbon budget constraints. Significant players in electricity 
are Statkraft (power production), Statnett (transmission) and large, mostly municipality-
owned, integrated power companies such as Hafslund, BKK and Trønderenergi. As is 
the case for Statoil, the public ownership of Statkraft is managed through the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, again contributing to blurring the distinction between regulation 
and operation. 
Norway does not have a developed gas distribution network, unlike most OECD countries. 
Electricity, including heat pumps, constitutes the main source of heating for buildings. 
Wood is also used as a fuel, contributing to episodes of low air quality in urban areas, 
especially in winter. Norway had early firms producing electric vehicles (Think, Buddy) 
and partly for that reason, zero-emission cars have enjoyed an extremely advantageous 
tax regime. This, combined with other advantages (permission to drive in bus lanes; 
public charging infrastructure; free passage on toll roads and ferries) and steep taxation of 
conventional, fossil fuel vehicles, has led to many Norwegians buying electric vehicles. In 
2014, the market share was 12.5% for zero-emission vehicles, mostly electric.28
24 Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (2013). “Energi i Norge 2012”. Online: http://www.nve.no/Global/Energi/
Analyser/Energi%20i%20Norge%20folder/FOLDN2013.pdf, accessed 11 Aug 2015.
25 Run-of-river projects cannot store water to produce when demand is the highest.
26 Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced 
from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market
27 http://www.nve.no/opprinnelsesgarantier
28 http://www.ofvas.no/bilsalget-i-2014/category648.html
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≈ NGOs 
The main environmental NGOs are Naturvernforbundet (Friends of the Earth Norway) 
and Framtiden i våre hender (FIVH, Future in Our Hands). International NGOs such as 
Greenpeace and World Wildlife Fund are also represented. Norway also has a set of 
climate and environmental foundations acting as quasi-NGOs: 
 y Bellona, emphasising carbon capture and storage (CCS) and nuclear safety;
 y Zero, working for technology solutions to climate change, notably electric transport; 
 y Norwegian Climate Foundation, emphasising fossil risk, divestment and corporate 
and municipal action to curb GHG emissions. 
The two former are characterised by some as ‘corporatist’ given their friendliness with 
Norwegian business interests (Mildenberger, 2015). Increased levels of public funding 
for environmental NGOs, often through joint projects initiated by the state, has led to 
the emergence of what Bortne et al. (2002) characterise as new, ‘semi-governmental 
organisations’. 
≈ Business and labour associations 
Norway is a coordinated market economy, where business associations and labour 
unions play an integral part in policymaking and the development of regulation. These 
associations have traditionally supported industrial development, including expansion of 
the oil and gas sector. Arguably, this role has given fossil fuels a ‘double representation’ 
and made deep emission cuts difficult (Mildenberger, 2015). Key business federations 
related to energy and climate change are Energi Norge (Energy Norway), Norsk Industri 
(Norwegian Industry) and Norsk Olje og gass (Norwegian Oil and Gas Association). 
≈ Research 
Norway has strong research institutions in physical climate science, including the Bjerknes 
Centre for Climate Research in Bergen, the largest climate research centre in the Nordic 
countries. Research on climate impacts and mitigation has lagged behind, but efforts to 
bolster these areas are underway in most universities. CICERO in Oslo is the largest centre 
to focus on societal aspects of climate change. Norway has also launched 11 centres for 
environmentally-friendly energy.
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Date Key event
1882 Norway's first hydroelectric power plant
1969 Discovery of North Sea oil
1970s Protests against hydroelectric dams
1972 Statoil established
1990 Sovereign Wealth Fund (“oil fund”) set up
2011 Discovery of Johan Sverdrup oil field
2012 Petroleum sector accounts for 23% of value creation in Norway
2013 Controversy over oil drilling around Lofoten-Vesterålen-Senja archipelago
2015 Parliament instructs Sovereign Wealth Fund to implement fossil fuel 
divestment strategy
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Key climate and energy-related events in Norway
     
29
In 1882, Norway’s first hydroelectric power plant, and one of the first in Europe, was built 
in connection with the Senja nickel works (Olje- og energidepartementet, 2013). A key 
feature of the country’s development is the ambitious and successful government policy 
in the early 20th century to attract foreign investors (France, UK, others) while assuring 
that long-term ownership of rivers/waterfalls would revert to the state (‘hjemfallsretten’). 
Currently, about 90% of electricity production in Norway is government owned, with local 
and regional authorities holding a large share. Hydroelectric power capacity expanded 
rapidly in Norway between 1950 and 1990, leading to controversy between environmental 
and industrial interests. Protests against the Mardøla (1970) and Alta (1979) dams included 
civil disobedience by campaigners (in the Alta case, also a hunger strike) and have 
remained as iconic events in the history of Norwegian environmental movement. Both 
dams were eventually built and are currently feeding electricity to the grid. 
Probably the most important event related to energy and climate change in Norway 
was the discovery of North Sea oil at the Ekofisk field in 1969, and the subsequent 
establishment of Statoil in 1972. A blend of private investment (initially by international oil 
majors) and meticulous government involvement (through active ownership, support for 
research, and active regulation) has produced a profitable and dominant industry: 
“Petroleum activities have contributed significantly to economic growth in 
Norway, and to the financing of the Norwegian welfare state. Through over 40 
years of operations, the industry has created values in excess of NOK 12,000 
billion in current terms. In 2012, the petroleum sector accounted for 23 percent 
of value creation in the country. This is more than twice the value creation of 
the manufacturing industry… Investments in 2012 amounted to over NOK 175 
billion, or 29 percent of the country’s total real investments.”30
29 http://www.nbim.no/fondet/om-oljefondet/
30 https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/energy/oil-and-gas/norways-oil-history-in-5-minutes/id440538/
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The oil industry accounts for the greatest single contribution of greenhouse gas emissions 
from Norway in terms of territorial CO2 emissions (about 14 Mt/year in 2011)31 and much 
more if factoring in ‘downstream’ emissions from burning of the Norwegian-produced 
oil and gas in other countries (about 490 Mt/year).32 Oil production in the North Sea has 
been declining, but the discovery of the giant Johan Sverdrup field in 2011 gave a boost to 
investment and employment in the sector. By contrast, the steep decline in oil prices in 
2014 combined with an already planned decline in investment has recently led to a sense 
in Norway that the oil and gas sector has entered a stage of irreversible decline. 
A major controversy around the 2013 parliamentary elections was whether oil and gas 
drilling should be allowed around the Lofoten-Vesterålen-Senja archipelago. The main 
arguments against such drilling related to the vulnerabilities of the rich fishing grounds in the 
area, but climate concerns and questions about the wisdom of prioritising non-renewable 
resources (fossil fuels) over renewable ones (fish) constituted an important secondary line 
of argument. To avoid so-called ‘Dutch disease’, the condition by which a sudden influx of 
resources creates inflation and crowds out other industry to the detriment of the national 
economy, Norway sets aside the direct income from oil and gas royalties into a sovereign 
wealth fund (SWF). This ‘oil fund’ was recently asked by Parliament to divest from companies 
deriving more than 30% of their revenue or output from coal, following successful 
campaigns by some political parties and by environmental NGOs and foundations.
Anticipated consequences of climate change in Norway
The most prominent climate-related events in Norway are floods and landslides. The late 
summer of 2015 saw major inundations in Eastern Norway. In the autumn of 2014, the 
Western towns of Odda, Flåm and Voss were hit as rivers overran their banks. A landslide 
related to unusually heavy rain claimed three lives in Bergen in 2005.33 
The Norwegian Climate Services Centre has estimated the following most likely changes to 
occur by 2100, based on the IPCC scenarios RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 (Hanssen-Bauer 
et al., 2015): 
 y Annual temperature increase of about 4.5ºC (range: 3.3–6.4ºC); 
 y Annual precipitation increase of about 18% (range: 7-23%); 
 y More frequent occurrences of heavy, concentrated rainfall; greater volumes per event; 
 y Larger and more frequent floods from rainfall; 
 y Smaller and less frequent floods from snow melt;
 y Snow will almost disappear from low-lying areas most years; more snow could be 
seen in some areas of high altitude; 
 y There will be fewer glaciers and remaining glaciers will be much smaller;
 y Sea level will increase by 15-55cm depending on location; 
 y Temperatures are likely to rise the most in the northernmost region of Norway.
31 Norway’s 6th national communication to the UNFCCC, Table 10S1, p. 228.
32 Glen Peters, Cicero, personal communication, 30 May 2015, see also Peters GP, Minx JC, Weber CL, et al. (2011). Growth in emission 
transfers via international trade from 1990 to 2008. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108: 8903-8908.
33 http://www.nrk.no/hordaland/fem-ar-siden-hatlestad-tragedien-1.7290256
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Norway does not have any significant climate sceptical news outlets. The business daily 
Dagens Næringsliv is generally seen as having some of the best climate-related reporting 
and commentary. The major liberal-conservative broadsheets Aftenposten and Bergens 
Tidende as well as the left-leaning Klassekampen had the most climate reporting in 2013, 
while the country’s largest tabloid, Verdens Gang, had the least (Eide and Naper, 2014). 
In the campaign leading up to the 2013 parliamentary election, climate change was 
expected by some to become a dominant issue, but in fact received less coverage than 
health and education, and less than during the 2009 election campaign, although high 
volumes of letters to the editor on the issue were recorded (Eide and Naper, 2014). Key 
sub-topics related to climate change discussed in Norwegian media are the use of gas as a 
‘bridge fuel’, Norwegian dependence on oil (and related risks) and the utility of action by a 
relatively small country. 
Journalists in Norway discuss the acceptability of campaign journalism related to climate 
change (Ytterstad, 2014). Overall, they accept conventional climate science, but debate the 
extent to which their own opinions should be allowed to enter their task of informing the 
public. The ideal of objectivity is seen as an absolute requirement, but is considered hard 
to fulfil.
Norway and COP21
The 2015 Paris agreement was greeted publicly by key cabinet ministers and the main 
Norwegian political parties. The Norwegian preference for coordinating its climate policy 
with the EU remains, including the relatively strong emphasis on financing emission cuts 
in other countries due to perceived high abatement costs domestically in sectors such as 
transportation, fossil fuel extraction and agriculture. However, it remains unclear to what 
extent the EU is willing to include Norway under its climate policy umbrella. 
Figure 3: Media use concerning 
information about climate change, 
Norwegian Citizen Panel (Wave 2, 
March 2014)
Question wording: “How important 
are the following sources to you 
when you seek information on global 
warming or climate change?”
1 2 3 4 5
Extent of use
Blogs/other web sites
Other
Social media
Regional/local newspapers
Environmental org.
Radio
Government reports
National newspapers
Research reports
TV
Media reporting in Norway
Data from the Norwegian Citizen Panel (2014) indicate that TV, research reports and 
national newspapers are important sources of information about climate change (see 
Figure 3 below).
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After the emergence of the 1.5°C aspirational target, a key question asked in Norway was 
what the consequences would be for the oil and gas industry. Environmental NGOs such 
as Bellona argued that the strengthened global ambition would spell the end of Norwegian 
oil and gas after 2035.34 At the same time, the Minister of Petroleum and Energy argued 
that the deal would cause greater demand for Norwegian natural gas due to its ability to 
replace coal in power generation.35 The debate between environmental and economic 
interests over the size of future Norwegian hydrocarbon production thus continues.
34 Dette betyr klimaavtalen i Paris for Norge, Aftenposten. 14 Dec 2015. Online: http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/Dette-
betyr-klimaavtalen-i-Paris-for-Norge-8282201.html, accessed 3 May 2016.
35 Olje- og energiminister Tord Lien: - Frederic Hauge må ha tatt for mye Møllers tran. Aftenposten, 12 Dec 2015. Online: http://www.
aftenposten.no/okonomi/Olje--og-energiminister-Tord-Lien---Frederic-Hauge-ma-ha-tatt-for-mye-Mollers-tran-8281908.html, 
accessed 3 May 2016.
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Historical, cultural & policy context
The UK has traditionally been a country heavily dependent upon fossil fuels for its 
existence. As the cradle of the European industrial revolution it pioneered early 
exploitation of its abundant coal reserves, has used coal and gas for much of its electricity 
generation and heating, and during the 1980s and 90s was a net exporter of oil from the 
North Sea fields. However, for various historical, institutional and political reasons the UK 
currently regards itself as a leader in international and domestic climate change policy. 
Dependence on coal for domestic fires and power stations in the cities was challenged 
as early as in 1952, when the great London smog killed an estimated 4,000 people and 
led to the clean air act in 1956 restricting the burning of coal in urbanised areas. Perhaps 
paradoxically given the poor environmental conditions that had existed in all major 
cities across the UK up until that time, British identity and culture also incorporate a view 
of the nation and its countryside as a ‘green and pleasant land’ – wholly free from the 
degradations of industrial development. This aspect of British environmental identity 
is one of the reasons, latterly, why some energy developments in the countryside, and 
not just nuclear power, have been fiercely resisted by campaigners. The 1950s also saw 
an ambitious programme of nuclear power development launched at a number of sites 
across the UK, utilising home-grown gas-cooled reactor technologies and with only muted 
local and national public opposition. As a nuclear weapons state, however, the rise of CND 
(Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) during the 1960s would begin to change attitudes to 
nuclear power as well. During this time the question of acid rain and ozone depletion also 
became prominent in public discourse, although this was typically framed as a threat to 
continental European rather than UK forests. 
A widespread feeling of national environmental identity (being associated with the 
green landscape) might be able to explain attitudes towards renewable energy – we 
will be able to explore whether the four countries define their national identity in the 
same way and how that affects their attitudes towards climate change policies.
In the 1970s came the discovery of the North Sea oil and gas fields, although a debate has 
existed ever since about the extent to which the governments of the day squandered the 
resource (by taking a very different licensing and exploitation policy to that followed in 
Norway). Ownership and use of these North Sea oil resources has subsequently become 
a point of fierce contention between those seeking independence for Scotland from the 
UK. Politics and energy have never been far apart, with the UK’s ‘dash for gas’ for electricity 
production being in part a by-product of the Thatcher government’s determination to 
diminish the domestic coal industry, and thereby undermine the miners’ unions, coupled 
with electricity privatisation.
UK:
A socio-political profile     
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Due to the long-standing role of fossil fuels, and in particular coal and (North Sea) oil, 
in the British economy, there will be sections and parts of the UK with more favourable 
views on these fossil energy sources.
The UK has always held a leading role in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
through modelling work conducted by the UK Meteorological Office and its Hadley Centre 
for Climate Prediction and Research as well as work at the University of East Anglia’s 
Climatic Research Unit (CRU). British scientist Sir John Houghton was the first chair of 
working group 1 (physical science basis) of the IPCC which first reported in 1990. In 1988 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made a significant policy intervention in her speech 
to the Royal Society on 27 September: “It is possible… that we have unwittingly begun a 
massive experiment with the system of the planet itself”. In 1989 she followed this with 
a major speech on global environmental change to the United Nations. Although both 
this and the earlier speech was seen by some as in part an attempt to bolster the place 
of nuclear power in advance of electricity privatisation, coming as it did from a political 
party seen as hostile to state intervention, it is cited by Carvalho and Burgess (2005) as a 
key ‘elite cue’ prompting subsequent media reporting and raised levels of public concern 
about the issue in the UK.
Moving to the turn of the millennium, the year 2000 saw the first of a series of major 
flood events across the UK, with the influential advisory body the Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollution calling the UK’s recent reduction in GHG emissions ‘largely 
coincidental’ (because of the dash for gas). It became the first to advocate a cut of national 
CO2 emissions by 60% by 2050 from 2000 levels. A series of policy events then came 
together around the years 2005 and 2006, including scientific discussion of defining 
‘dangerous climate change’, campaigns by NGOs for sweeping emissions cuts, the IPPC 
4th assessment report and the Stern Review of the economic impacts of climate change. 
The Stern Review, commissioned by Gordon Brown in the UK Treasury, concluded it 
made better economic sense to mitigate now rather than wait until impacts are manifest. 
Because it was written by an economist, this report achieved very significant international 
and UK impact (and controversy) in both the media and policy circles. The political 
response was also important, as it laid the foundation for the current UK policy position 
and instruments. In July the All Party Parliamentary Climate Change Group inquiry (Clayton, 
Pidgeon, Whitby, 2006) recommended the setting up of an independent advisory climate 
expert committee to agree climate targets and hold the government to account, a measure 
enacted in the 2008 Climate Change Act, alongside a commitment to an 80% emissions 
target by 2050, with very strong cross-party parliamentary support.  
To monitor and manage progress to achieve this goal, the Climate Change Act sets carbon 
budgets for five year periods (see Table on next page for currently set budgets). 
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Table: Carbon budgets set out by the Climate Change Act
Carbon budget level
Percentage reduction 
below base year levels
3,018 1,9502,5442,782
23% 50%35%29%
1
2008-12
2
2013-17
3
2018-22
4
2023-27
 36 
36 Million tonnes carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e)
The independent Committee on Climate Change still serves as the major advisory body 
shaping UK emissions policy, and is proving a model for other countries (e.g. Denmark). 
In 2014, emissions were down to 36% below the 1990 baseline (8% decrease compared 
with 2013) despite economic growth in 2014. Based on the latest policies and emissions, 
the Committee on Climate Change concluded in 2015 that the UK is on track to meet the 
second and third carbon budget (up to 2022) but needs to make more progress across all 
sectors to meet the 2050 target. The level of cross-party agreement means that climate 
change in the UK has not seen the same levels of intense political debate as in the USA, 
although there is a consistent relationship between political ideology and scepticism about 
climate change (Whitmarsh, 2011). 
Over the last 10 years nuclear power has been framed as a possible solution to climate 
change and as a reliable energy source for the UK (DTI, 2006; BERR, 2008a, 2008b). 
Despite this framing, research conducted in 2005 and 2010 showed that UK public 
preferred renewable energy sources over nuclear power (Poortinga, Pidgeon, & Lorenzoni, 
2006; Spence et al., 2010). However, in 2010 more people agreed that there are benefits of 
nuclear power to people in the UK (60% in 2010 compared to in 49% in 2005).
While research shows that the majority of the UK public favours renewable energy 
over nuclear power, in a cross-national comparison the UK can be expected to be 
more supportive of nuclear power as part of a future energy mix than France, Germany, 
and Norway. More so than in other countries nuclear power in the UK has been framed 
as playing a central role in reducing carbon emissions. Furthermore, responses to the 
Fukushima accident have been more muted in the UK than in other countries.
In policy terms the UK government has in recent years remained committed to the 
support (through a range of financial instruments) of the development of renewable 
energy particularly onshore and offshore wind, gas technology, and nuclear power. 
However, policy has been at times inconsistent or ineffective, with the new Conservative 
administration pledging to deregulate the energy market, supporting renewable energy 
under the condition that it is ‘cost effective’. 
In the first few months after the elections in 2015, the conservative government pledged 
to phase out subsidies for onshore wind and solar installations, to stop the Green 
Deal (financial support for homeowners to insulate their homes) and announced the 
privatisation of the Green Investment Bank (although they remain committed to the 
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Climate Change Act and to the Paris agreement). Furthermore, the current Conservative 
government announced to expand nuclear power, continue the support of development of 
North Sea oil and gas, and the safe development of shale gas. With a focus on cost, access 
and supply in the energy debate, the Conservative government continues to back the new 
nuclear power station at Hinkley, despite strong criticism about increasing costs associated 
with finishing this project. 
UK businesses and professionals criticise the government’s mixed signals, lack of clear 
regulations and hesitancy to invest in low carbon technologies. John Cridland, director 
general of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) said in the lead-up to the climate 
negotiations in Paris in 2015: “(…) despite the progress so far, today’s investors are more 
uncertain about the UK’s low-carbon future. From the rollback of renewables to the mixed 
messages on energy efficiency, these changes send a worrying signal about the UK as a 
place for low-carbon investment.”
Ahead of the UK election, leaders of the three main parties (Conservatives, Labour, Liberal 
Democrats) signed a joint pledge in February 2015 on climate change. The pledge states 
that “Climate change is one of the most serious threats facing the world today. It is not 
just a threat to the environment, but also to our national and global security, to poverty 
eradication and economic prosperity.” The three leaders further committed “to seek a 
fair, strong, legally binding, global climate deal which limits temperature rises to below 
2°C”. Despite criticism that this pledge simply reframes previous commitments, this joint 
agreement was seen as a strong signal that the future UK government will keep climate 
change on the political agenda. However, during the election campaign, climate change 
was not a prominent topic and has barely been mentioned by Labour or the Conservatives 
during the launch of their manifestos (The Carbon Brief, 2015). In terms of the UK’s current 
energy mix, the total production of primary fuels in the UK has fallen by 62% since 1999 
mainly due to the exhaustion of oil and gas. Subsequently, dependency on energy imports 
increased sharply, with 47% of energy used in the UK being imported in 2013 (-17% in 
2000). In 2013, 5.2% of energy production came from renewable sources (4.2% in 2012).
Figure 4: Distribution of 
energy produced in 2013 
(source: DECC, 2014)
Coal - 36%
Renewables - 15%
Nuclear - 20%
Gas - 27%
Oil - 1%
Other - 1%
The proportion of electricity being generated from renewable sources rose from 6.7% in 
2009 to 14.9% in 2013 (22.3% for the first quarter of 2015). Bioenergy and onshore wind are 
currently the main sources of renewable energy in the UK (see Figure 6).
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Key actors in the British context
The UK has a range of actors who have been involved in climate and energy policy, across 
the whole spectrum of non-governmental organisations and civil society, government, and 
the corporate sector.
≈ Government 
The main responsibility for climate policy is split across two major government 
departments. The first of these, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), 
was set up in 2008 in response to a perceived institutional fragmentation between 
climate and energy policy and the belief that this would produce a more joined-up 
approach. It holds the main responsibility for energy issues (development, regulation, 
decommissioning) as well as international climate negotiations. In effect it holds the brief 
for ‘climate mitigation’ widely drawn. DECC has to balance a range of responsibilities – 
for example it has responsibility for both supply and many demand reduction incentives, 
energy security and affordability as well as decarbonisation, and responsibility for the 
UK oil and gas industry alongside both renewables and nuclear policy. A very large 
proportion of the DECC budget is dedicated to dealing with energy legacy issues (clean-
up and decommissioning) at fossil fuel and nuclear sites. Also many of the policies that 
might affect the UK’s carbon emissions are not under the control of DECC but set by 
Figure 5: Distribution 
of electricity generated 
in 2013 (source: DECC 
press release, 2014) 
Primary Oil - 39%
Bioenergy & Waste - 6%
Primary Electricity 
(nuclear, wind and natural 
ﬂow hydro) - 16%
Natural Gas - 32%
Coal - 7%
Figure 6: Renewable 
sources of electricity 
generation in the UK 
2000-2014 (source: 
DECC, 2015)
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other departments (Communities and Local Government, Transport, Welsh and Scottish 
governments in some cases). In addition, the ability of DECC to drive climate mitigation 
policies is very much dependent on the support of HM Treasury which controls the actual 
budget (both public but also that levied from consumer bills) that can be spent on low-
carbon infrastructure and energy efficiency.
By contrast the UK Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA) which is 
a much bigger department than DECC and is mostly concerned with farming and food 
policy has main responsibilities for climate adaptation, although some measures (e.g. flood 
defences) are further devolved in England to the Environment Agency (EA in England, 
Scottish Environment Protection Agency in Scotland, and Natural Resources Wales in 
Wales). This latter observation points out the fragmenting responsibilities for climate 
change under current devolution arrangements, which can hinder a collective response.  
A key institutional innovation in 2008 was the creation of the Committee on Climate 
Change (CCC). This is an independent statutory body which was established under the 
Climate Change Act (2008) to advise UK and devolved administration governments on 
setting and meeting carbon budgets, and preparing for climate change. It has a close 
relationship with DECC – both advising it and critiquing its policies – but also has a 
‘Climate Adaptation Subcommittee’ which interfaces primarily with DEFRA.
≈ NGOs 
A range of NGOs including Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, RSPB, WWF-UK and Green 
Alliance have been active at the highest policy level. The UK also has specific climate-
related information sources such as Carbon Brief or Climate Outreach (formally Climate 
Outreach Information Network). 
≈ Corporate 
Major energy companies supply and generate and are mostly non-UK owned now, 
including EDF, RWE NPower, Scottish and Southern etc., while BP and Royal Dutch Shell 
remain significant players in the UK and world oil and gas extraction industry. Energy 
UK is the trade association who represent the energy industry as a whole. A number of 
UK corporates have at times taken a leading role in arguing the case for climate change 
mitigation, including the insurance industry very early on in the history who are concerned 
with long range extreme weather risks. Progressive business-backed organisations such as 
the Aldersgate Group and Corporate Leaders Group seek to make the voice of progressive 
multi-sector businesses heard in the climate and energy debate and are regularly arguing 
for ambitious climate mitigation policies.
≈ Academic actors
Academic and climate science institutes tend to be more distributed (i.e. there is no single 
Potsdam Institute). The government funded Met Office Hadley Centre is responsible for 
climate modelling (UK Met Office itself is the weather forecasting agency). In the University 
sector a key player is the University of East Anglia (home-base of the Climatic Research 
Unit – a modelling facility who work side by side with NASA and the Hadley Centre - the 
Future Earth Initiative, and the Tyndall centre for Climate Change Research). Other key 
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players include Reading University (Walker Institute), Imperial College and UCL in London, 
Leeds University, Manchester and Exeter Universities. Environmental sociology of climate 
science is studied at Lancaster University and at Edinburgh University. Cardiff is the UK 
centre for work on climate beliefs and public engagement.
Key climate and energy-related events in the UK
Date Key event
1945 Britain begins infrastructure reconstruction, including post-war nuclear 
weapons and civil nuclear power programme.
1952 The London smog – extreme event, 4000 casualties lead to the Clean Air Act 
1956
1957 Electricity production remains dominated by abundant reserves of indigenous 
coal from England, Scotland and South Wales, with a small contribution also 
from hydropower.
1960s The Central Electricity Generating board rolls out modern very large (1-2 GW 
scale) coal fired electricity generating stations across the UK (e.g. Longannet, 
Drax, East Aberthaw, Kingsnorth),
1965-1974 Major oil and gas field discoveries made in the North Sea.
1973/1974 1st  OPEC Oil Crisis
1970s Electricity blackouts (the so-called ‘3-day week’) caused by high inflation, 
industrial unrest, and crippling strikes by mine workers. 
1978/1979 ‘Winter of Discontent’ followed in the spring by first election victory of Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservative government with a liberal privatisation agenda.
1982 Nigel Lawson new Secretary of State for Energy lays ideological foundation for 
later energy privatisations.
1984/1985 The position of coal has already become precarious following the loss of its 
traditional domestic gas market to North Sea sources. The scene is set for the 
decline of the traditional coal industry alongside the ‘dash for gas’
1986 First big energy privatisation, of British Gas
1986 The Chernobyl accident occurs in the Ukraine.
27 Sep. 1988 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s speech to the Royal Society puts climate 
change on the political agenda. 
1990 Beginning of privatisation of electricity generating industry which has the effect 
of new companies planning many gas fired plants (the ‘dash for gas’).
1992 UN Framework Convention Climate Change signed in Rio.
1997 New Labour and Tony Blair comes to power: promises to cut national CO2 
emissions by 20% by 2010 (from 1990 levels), Kyoto protocol also signed.
1999 Second peak of North Sea oil production.
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Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution calls the UK’s recent reduction in 
GHG emissions ‘largely coincidental’ (because of the ‘dash for gas’); the first to 
advocate cut of national CO2 emissions by 60% by 2050 (from 2000 levels). 
2003 Energy White Paper Our energy future: creating a low carbon economy (DTI). 
Three main objectives: energy security (nuclear door left open), climate 
change (60% cuts), reducing fuel poverty.
2005 Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change international conference (DEFRA) 
concludes that ‘dangerous’ should be defined as a 2°C rise in global 
temperatures compared to pre-industrial levels.
2005 Friends of the Earth launch ‘Big Ask’ campaign.
2006 At the end of January the opposition parties agree a cross-party memorandum 
on climate change, leading to the All Party Parliamentary Climate Change Group 
inquiry (Clayton et al. 2006) which recommends the setting up of an independent 
advisory climate committee similar to the MPC of the Bank of England.
2006 Stern Review (Chancellor and Treasury): makes economic sense to mitigate 
now rather than wait until impacts are manifest.
2007 Major summer flooding in June experienced across the UK (Northern Ireland, 
East Yorkshire and Midlands, Gloucestershire, Oxfordshire).
2009/2010 ‘Climategate’: December and January saw the theft and publication on the web of 
emails from members of the Climatic Research Unit at University of East Anglia.
2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan.
2012 Royal Society Report on Unconventional Gas and Oil.
July 2014 Significant protests and direct action in leafy Sussex (Balcombe) against oil 
exploration.
2013/2014 Winter flooding. Storms in December and January caused heavy flooding 
across the UK.
2014/2015 The fossil fuel divestment campaign gains momentum in the UK.
May 2015 Election of new Conservative government with a thin majority and some 
backbench climate scepticism embedded, although the UK Independence 
Party (against Europe, Wind power and Climate) and the Green Party, while 
securing significant votes, fail to make the expected seat gains.
November 2015 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 21st Conference of 
the Parties (COP21) in Paris led to an agreement amongst ca. 196 countries to 
keep global temperature increase “well below 2°C”. 
June 2016 Referendum on whether or not the UK should remain a member of the 
European Union.
                                                       
                  37
37 Written prior to the June 24th result of the referendum.
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Inspired by the discussion around climate change migrations sparked by the current 
refugee crisis in the EU, our research could assess the perceived link between climate 
change and migrations and concern about 'climate change victims'.
Anticipated consequences of climate change in the UK
The 2012 Climate Change Risk Assessment outlined the potential risks to the UK posed by 
increases in global temperature.
Heatwaves, cold winters and extreme flooding events have already affected the UK and 
caused disruptions and associated economic damage, for example the 2007 summer 
floods, cold winter of 2009, 2010, and drought in spring 2011 (Defra, 2012).
In more recent years the UK experienced the severe winter flooding and storms of 
2013/2014 with heavy flooding across the UK. Overall the December and January storms 
resulted in around seven fatalities and 1,700 properties flooded across England (Met. 
Office, 2014).
With regards to expected future risks of climate change for the UK the Risk Assessment 
describes the highest costs and disruptions being expected through flooding. More 
precisely, analysis for England and Wales showed future potential risk estimates are within 
£1.5 billion to £3.5 billion by 2020s, £2.1 billion to £12 billion by the 2080s. As the second 
most severe risk, hotter summers are expected to affect water supplies and increase 
health risks.
People in more endangered areas (and/or people who indicate previous experience 
with climate change impacts) might perceive climate change to be less distant, which 
might lead to higher concern about climate change and more willingness to engage in 
related behaviours.
Furthermore, the UK is also likely to be affected by storms, floods and droughts that occur 
outside of the UK, through disruptions to trade or supply chains.
However, the 2012 report also highlighted that the potential climate risks in other parts 
of the world are much greater than those expected for the UK. Potential opportunities 
that higher temperatures in the UK would bring about are, for example, the potential for 
growing new crops as a result of a warmer climate and longer growing seasons where 
water and nutrients are not limiting factors.
The UK public might be more positive about the national impacts of climate change 
compared to people in (e.g.) France due to the potential opportunities for the UK.
Media reporting in the UK
≈ Newspaper coverage of climate change     
Carvalho and Burgess (2005) identified three distinct circuits of climate change - 1985-
1990, 1991-1996, 1997-2003 - which were characterised by different framings of risks 
associated with climate change in UK media coverage (see figure 7). According to Carvalho 
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and Burgess (2005) two important factors shaped the UK’s broadsheet newspapers’ 
discourse on ‘dangerous’ climate change: top political figures and the dominant ideological 
standpoints in different newspapers. The first period, from 1985 to 1990 (“from silence to 
political construction of risk”) saw an important discursive transformation from climate 
change being a scientific to a more politically constructed issue. At first, scientists were 
the exclusive definers of the issue for the press; although their capacity to influence the 
media was limited. That was changed by Mrs Thatcher’s speech to the Royal Society in 
September 1988, after which the media began to represent climate change as a major risk 
for human security (also see Jaspal & Nerlich, 2012).
Figure 7: Cultural circuits 
of climate change in UK 
Broadsheet newspapers, 
1985–2003 (Source: 
Carvalho & Burgess, 2005)
In the second period, from 1991 to 1996 (“Climate change recedes in the public sphere”), 
climate change began to receive less newspaper coverage and as result receded from the 
public’s attention. After the high levels of coverage at the end of the 1980s, editorial fatigue 
set in as the UK experienced an economic recession in the early 1990s. Figure 7 shows that 
coverage of climate change declined dramatically in 1991, and remained low until 1997. 
The third phase, from 1997- 2003 (“Danger comes close to home”) was characterised 
by a substantial increase in volume of press coverage which can be directly related to 
important policy events, such as the Kyoto Protocol. In contrast to the earlier reporting, the 
discourse since 1999-2000 was marked by a new sense of urgency attached to the risk of 
climate change.
Further increases of newspaper coverage of anthropogenic climate change were observed 
between 2003 and 2006 (Boykoff, 2007), with an extended period of high newspaper 
coverage during the 2006-2007 period (see Figures 8 and 9; Grundmann & Scott, 2012). 
The high level of coverage was associated with important policy events, such as the 
publication of the Stern Review (2006) and the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007), 
the awarding of the Nobel Prize to the IPCC in 2007, as well as the release of Al Gore’s 
documentary ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ (2006). Newspaper coverage of anthropogenic 
climate change culminated in a peak at the end of 2009, during the United Nations 
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen (December 2009) and the ‘Climategate’ affair 
(November 2009). The high levels of media coverage was followed by a dramatic slump in 
early 2010, after which attention dropped to the low levels seen around 2005 (Grundmann 
& Scott, 2012). 
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While newspaper coverage has fluctuated ever since the 2009 high, no clear peaks have 
been observed between 2010 and 2014 (see Figure 8). The higher levels of newspaper 
coverage of anthropogenic climate change throughout 2015 can almost exclusively be 
attributed to the Guardian’s fossil fuel divestment campaign. The Guardian also published 
the most articles on the COP21 conference held in Paris, resulting in a peak of media 
reporting at the end of 2015 and beginning of 2016.
Figure 8: Newspaper 
coverage of climate change 
and global warming in the 
UK between 2000 and 2016 
(source: Luedecke et al., 
2015)
Shaw (2013) reported an increase in the number of newspaper stories featuring a mention 
of the 2°C dangerous limit, in line with the newspaper reporting of anthropogenic climate 
change in the UK. However, the results show that news reports largely ignore the 2°C limit 
as a division between safe and dangerous climate change. The term ‘2°C’ only received 
a small number of mentions over the 2000-2012 period. While Carvalho and Burgess 
(2005) solely focused on the coverage of climate change in the broadsheets, other studies 
also included ‘tabloid’ newspapers. Gavin (2007, cited in Anderson, 2009) found a limited 
amount of newspaper coverage in the British ‘tabloid’ press between 1996 and 2000.
Research reported here confirm the importance of policy-relevant events for media 
coverage of climate change and global warming. Peaks and sharp increases in the 
coverage of anthropogenic climate change have been observed at the time of the US 
withdrawal from the Kyoto process (2001), the G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland (July 
2005); Hurricane Katrina (August 2005); the release of the film ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ 
(May 2006), the Stern Review (October 2006); the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (early 
2007), the Nobel Prize to the IPCC in October 2007, the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen (December 2009) and the ‘Climategate’ affair that started in 
November 2009 (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005; Boykoff, 2007; Grundmann & Scott, 2012). 
Figure 9 shows prolonged attention in 2007 (at the time of the publication of the IPCC AR4 
report and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the IPCC) and a short peak of attention 
in 2009 (at the time of the Copenhagen conference and the ‘Climategate’ affair). The peak 
at the end of 2015 and beginning of 2016 shows the attention for the COP21 climate talks in 
Paris.
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Painter and Ashe (2012) reported that when examining the media reporting in the UK, USA, 
France Brazil, China and India, more than 80 percent of the sceptical voices were found in 
the UK and US, with a big increase between 2007 and the 2009-2010 period. This makes 
climate scepticism to some extent an Anglophone phenomenon, at least in mainstream 
media. They further found that most of the sceptical views (40%) were expressed in the 
opinion pages and editorials. Climate sceptical voices are more common in right-leaning 
than in left-leaning newspapers (Painter, 2011). Carvalho and Burgess (2015) reported that 
the conservative, right-of-centre Times was more inclined to question the science behind 
climate change, while Boykoff and Mansfield (2008) claim that the politically conservative 
stance is a key element in shaping the Daily Mail’s ‘balanced’ coverage of climate change.
Due to the specific tendency in Anglophone countries to accord a huge volume of media 
attention to climate sceptic voices, public climate scepticism will be higher in the UK 
than the rest of Europe. The concentration of climate sceptical views in the media may 
also lead to a higher political polarisation than in the other European countries.
Boykoff (2008) reported that the discourses in UK tabloid newspapers are mainly framed 
through weather events, charismatic megafauna, and the movements of political actors 
and rhetoric, with only a few stories focusing on the risks and justice aspects of climate 
change. While almost all broadsheet coverage includes climate science depicting 
significant human contributions (98%; Boykoff, 2007), UK tabloids coverage significantly 
diverges from the scientific consensus that humans contribute to climate change (Boykoff 
& Mansfield, 2006). The tabloid coverage of climatic change was far more likely to be 
‘balanced’ (with roughly equal attention to competing views regarding human’s role in 
climate change) or to depict human contributions to climate change as negligible, as 
compared to broadsheet coverage of climate change.
With discourses being mainly framed in terms of extreme weather events, people in 
the UK may be more willing to attribute such events to climate change.
Doulton and Brown (2009) identified eight discourses in the media construction of climate 
change in four UK ‘quality’ newspapers between 1997 and 2007, reflecting ‘optimism’, 
‘rationalism’, ‘ethical mitigation’, ‘self-righteous mitigation’, ‘disaster strikes’, ‘potential 
catastrophe’, ‘crisis’ and ‘opportunity’. Overall, the ‘potential catastrophe’ frame was 
used most frequently over the 1997-2007 period. Doulton and Brown (2009) reported 
that trends in coverage were fairly consistent across the 1997-2007 period for the four 
newspapers. However, the four newspapers used distinct frames. Discourses concerned 
with likely severe impacts dominated coverage in the Guardian and the Independent 
Figure 9: Newspaper 
coverage of climate change 
and global warming in 
the UK between 2000 
and 2016, total of nine 
newspapers (source: 
Luedecke et al., 2015)
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since 1997, and in all four papers since 2006. Rationalism is the most common discourse 
represented in the Times and self-righteous mitigation in the Telegraph. Ethical mitigation 
was found in all four newspapers. 
O’Neill et al. (2015) found ten different frames in the reporting of the IPCC fifth framework 
report: Settled Science, Political or Ideological Struggle, Role of Science, Uncertain Science, 
Disaster, Security, Morality and Ethics, Opportunity, Economics and Health. The first five 
frames were used most frequently, with only a few mentions of the latter five frames (also 
see below). UK broadsheets, in particular the Guardian, provided the greatest newspaper 
coverage of the publication of the reports. The Guardian stood out in its use of the ‘political 
and ideological struggle’ frame. The Mail did not use a ‘settled science’ frame at all.
While levels of climate change scepticism have been low over the last few years the 
presence of climate change sceptic views in the UK media landscape might lead the 
public to underestimate how many people consider climate change in their daily lives. 
≈ Television broadcasts and online media
Most of the research on the coverage of climate change and global warming has been 
done on the printed media. Only a limited number of studies have focused on books (e.g. 
Jacques et al., 2008), television broadcasts (e.g. Painter, 2014), or online and social media, 
such as Twitter (e.g. Williams et al., 2015). The BBC takes a unique place in the UK media 
landscape. As the UK’s most important public service broadcaster, the BBC has a duty 
to be accurate and impartial in the coverage of the news. This also applies to coverage 
of science and scientific issues that feature prominently in the BBC’s public discourse. 
In an independent review of the accuracy and impartiality of the BBC science coverage, 
commissioned by the BBC Trust, Jones (2011) concluded that the BBC science coverage was 
generally of a high quality, but also noted that there should be no attempt to give equal 
weight to opinion and to evidence. Jones (2011) identified several instances where the BBC 
provided equal time to scientific experts and sceptics on the issue. The BBC’s attempt 
to be impartial in the treatment of climate change therefore may have resulted in a false 
balance of reporting on the issue (cf., Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). The House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee (2014) have criticised the BBC for making mistakes in 
their coverage of climate science by giving opinions and scientific fact the same weight. 
While politicians, lobbying groups and other interested parties should be heard on the 
issue, the BBC has to be clearer on their roles, i.e. whether interviewees are lobbyists or 
disinterested experts (ibid).
Painter (2014) reviewed the television coverage of the publication of the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment report (AR5) in six countries (Australia, Brazil, China, Germany, India and the 
UK). He used the four frames of ‘disaster’, ‘uncertainty’, ‘opportunity’, and ‘risk’ to analyse 
evening news bulletin the day before and the day of the release of working group reports.  
The disaster frame was the most prevalent, salient and dominant across all publications. 
While the climate ‘pause’ narrative (referring to a lack of significant rise in global average 
temperatures since 1998) was strongly present in the media in the UK and Australia in the 
run-up to the release of WG1, only limited time was provided to sceptical voices. Nearly 
three-quarters of all those appearing on screen were IPCC authors or other scientists. Also 
the one sceptic who was given prominence in the general BBC coverage had previously 
been an IPCC author. O’Neill et al. (2015) examined the television, newspaper and social 
66European Perceptions of Climate Change • Socio-political profiles to inform a cross-national survey in France, Germany, Norway and the UK
media coverage of the IPCC fifth assessment report in the UK and US. They found that the 
publication of the report gained far more attention in the UK than in the US, in particular 
in the legacy media (i.e. television broadcast and newspapers), although there were some 
noticeable differences in the frames between the different UK public service broadcasters. 
While the ‘settled science’ frame was used by all public service broadcasters, Channel 
4 was more likely to use a ‘disaster’ frame and the BBC an ‘uncertain science’ frame.  
Similarly, the ‘settled science’ frame dominated Twitter coverage in the UK.
UK and COP21
Ahead of the climate change conference in Paris, the UK was criticised by UN scientists 
for cutting renewables subsidies, suggesting that the UK have abandoned their leadership 
on climate change, while 150 other nations were making unprecedented pledges to shift 
towards.
Closer to the COP21, the public discourse was occupied with the terror attacks that took 
place in Paris only two weeks before the start of the conference. The French government 
decided to proceed hosting the COP in Paris under tightened security and with public 
demonstrations being cancelled. Tom Burke, a former UK government advisor, predicted 
that instead of taking the spotlight away from climate change, the terror attacks would 
make a deal more likely. He argued that some leaders will insist that by addressing climate 
change one of the drivers of terrorism will be removed, stressing the urgency for the UN 
nations to agree on how to respond to another global threat, climate change.
During the COP21 the media coverage was scarce but upon completion, all big UK 
newspapers featured the agreement, explained the content and implications for the UK 
(see peaks in figure 7 and figure 8).  
Globally, the outcome of the meeting received criticism from some NGOs (e.g. Friends of 
the Earth) for not being a binding agreement and for missing a detailed action plan on how 
the set targets will be met. In the UK, all political parties welcomed the agreement as an 
important step forwards. For the UK markets the commitment to reduce Britain’s carbon 
emissions offers some stability and reassurance that, despite mixed policy signals from the 
Conservative government, a shift towards green technologies can be expected.
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